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1. Introduction 
In this paper we discuss a particular framework for modeling labor supply behavior in the presence of 
complicated budget sets, qualitative job attributes and restrictions on hours of work, and apply this 
framework to analyze data on workers’ observed choice of sector and hours in the labor market. 
Compared to earlier attempts, our framework for estimating labor supply allows for a more complete 
empirical strategy in circumstances where job choices are not adequately summarized by hours and 
wages. 
 In the 1970s and 1980s labor supply studies applied the traditional textbook model for labor 
supply, extended to allow for convex and smooth tax functions (cf. contributions such as Rosen 
(1976), Wales and Woodland (1979), Nakamura and Nakamura (1981), Kohlase (1986) and Ransom 
(1987)). However, in most western countries the tax system and social benefit rules imply a non-
convex budget set.1 Fixed costs of working and tax deductions if working contribute to these non-
convexities. Attempts to take the non-convexity properties of the tax structure into account include 
Burtless and Hausman (1978), Blomquist (1983), (1992), Arrufat and Zabalza (1986), Hausman 
(1980), (1981), (1985), and Hausman and Ruud (1984). In principle it is possible to apply the 
“Hausman approach” to account for nonlinear and non-convex budget sets. That approach, however, is 
rather cumbersome when there are more than one adult in the household or when complicated social 
benefit- and tax deduction rules are present. In contrast, the particular approach advocated in our 
paper, and which we shall describe in a moment, has the advantage that it becomes simple to handle 
complicated nonlinear tax and transfer systems as well as non-standard opportunity sets. This is also 
the case for many-persons households. 
 In the studies mentioned above the mathematical structure of the modeling framework rests 
upon the assumption that the fundamental choice variables of the household in this context are 
“consumption” (composite) and “leisure” (hours of work), which can be chosen freely subject to the 
economic budget constraint. Yet, it seems apparent that hours of work and income are only two out of 
several job-related attributes, which are important for individual behavior in the labor market. “Type 
of work”, and other “non-pecuniary job attributes”, do often matter a great deal and may even be more 
important than hours of work. An extreme example of the latter phenomenon is found among 
scientists, artists and government bureaucrats for whom specific work-activities represent major means 
for self-realization. Another characteristic of the labor market is that hours of work are fixed for many 
                                                     
1 In recent years the tax and benefit system has been simplified in many countries. Most budget sets are, however, still non-
convex. 
4 
types of jobs. Thus, if an individual wishes to change his or her workload he or she would in this case 
have to change job.2 This property  is consistent with the findings of Altonji and Paxson (1988). 
 In view of the arguments above it may be more appropriate to consider labor supply behavior 
as the outcome of households choosing from a finite set of job “packages”, each of which is 
characterized by an offered wage rate, offered hours of work, and non-pecuniary attributes. The 
individual specific choice sets of job opportunities may be thought of as being determined by 
employers or in negotiation between employers and unions and they are thus exogenous to the 
individuals. The qualitative job attributes are often unobservable, or at most only partly observable to 
the analyst. This is the point of departure taken in this paper. Specifically, the choice environment is 
assumed to consist of a latent, individual specific set of jobs. A job is characterized by a combination 
of fixed hours of work, wage rate and non-pecuniary job-attributes (such as type of work and working 
conditions). The notion of individual specific choice sets is important for our modeling of choice 
constraints. In our setup there are thus two sources of unobserved heterogeneity, unobserved 
heterogeneity in tastes and in opportunities.  
 In Dagsvik (1994) a general framework for modeling this type of settings was developed. 
Simplified versions of this framework have been applied by Anderson et al. (1988), Aaberge, Dagsvik 
and Strøm (1990), (1995), Dagsvik and Strøm (1997) and Aaberge, Colombino and Strøm (1999) to 
analyze labor supply behavior. In contrast, our paper is more theoretical in that it focuses on a detailed 
discussion and interpretation of underlying assumptions of the framework in the context of modeling 
labor supply behavior, and relates the present approach to previous ones. In particular, we discuss how 
functional form and the probability law of unobservables can be justified from behavioral arguments, 
and we investigate empirically the properties of alternative functional form specifications. 
 Previous attempts to take (quantity) constraints on the choice set into account have been 
restricted solely to one job attribute, namely hours of work. Contributions by Ilmakunnas and Pudney 
(1990), Kapteyn, Kooreman and van Soest (1990), Dickens and Lundberg (1993), and van Soest 
(1994) emphasize the inability of standard empirical labor supply models to account for observed 
peaks in the hours of work distribution at part-time and full-time hours. They have discussed 
approaches to take account of this type of constraints in the econometric modeling of labor supply. 
These approaches are, however, different from the one developed in our paper. Below, we will show 
that these previous studies can be considered as a special case of our model. 
 In all of these recent labor supply contributions the individuals are assumed to have the same 
wage across jobs. Thus, in previous labor supply studies it is assumed that an individual has a fixed 
wage rate, and the possibility of job-specific wages are ignored. Labor market theories, like the 
                                                     
2 Alternatively, the worker may have to change the content of his current job. 
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theories of efficient wages and trade unions, suggest that wages may differ across jobs, see for 
example Krueger and Summers (1988) and Edin and Zetterberg (1992). In the labor supply literature 
there are approaches that allow offered job-specific wage rates to vary systematically with hours 
worked (Moffitt, 1984). 
 A serious problem with most structural econometric models is the lack of theoretical support 
for the choice of functional form and distributional assumptions of the unobservables. In this paper we 
propose a combined theoretical and empirical approach to this end. As is well known, one can apply 
the "Independence from Irrelevant Assumption" (IIA) to motivate the distribution of the stochastic 
error terms in random utility models. In this paper we apply a completely analogous assumption 
proposed by Dagsvik (1994). Under this assumption and a particular Poisson process representation of 
the distribution of the latent choice sets of jobs, the implied distribution of realized hours and wage 
rates turns out to be analogous to the continuous logit model introduced by Ben-Akiva, Litinas and 
Tsunokawa (1985). Similarly, it is an important challenge to provide a justification for the choice of 
functional form of the deterministic components in the probability model of realized hours and wage 
rates. In this respect the attitude among economists seems to be a general resignation: It is believed to 
be a hopeless task to achieve useful results on a purely theoretical basis, that is, from first principles. 
As a consequence, the functional form problem is “solved” by selecting a convenient parametric or 
semi-parametric mathematical structure, see for example Blomquist and Newey (2002) and van Soest, 
Das and Gong (2002). Data and statistical methods are applied to choose between competing 
candidates. Unfortunately, without theoretical principles almost any form is a priori possible and the 
correct one is difficult to determine because of unobserved variables and measurement errors. Within 
the field of psychology and psychophysics there is a tradition where functional forms are justified on 
the basis of invariance principles. These principles are similar to certain invariance principles applied 
in physics, which typically are invariant under uniform translation and rotation of the coordinate 
system. In this paper we discuss how results in Falmagne (1985) apply in our context and in our 
opinion lead to a plausible justification of functional forms. 
 The empirical part of the paper deals with labor supply among married females in Norway in 
1994, who can choose between jobs within  the public and the private sector of the economy. Other 
authors that analyze agents’ choice of sector are Magnac (1991) and Heckman and Sedlacek (1990). 
Magnac also allows for rationing in the sense that workers face costs of entry into a sector. However, 
neither Heckman and Sedlacek nor Magnac consider workers’ choice of hours.  
 The estimated model is used to simulate the impact on labor supply of introducing a flat tax 
reform, given that tax revenue is kept constant. Both the wage elasticities and the tax reform analysis 
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indicate that overall labor supply is moderately elastic, but these moderate responses shadow for much 
stronger inter-sectoral responses.  
 Recently, van Soest, Das and Gong (2002) have proposed a labor supply model where the 
agent faces no restrictions other than the budget constraint, and the “menu” of feasible hours of work 
is discrete. Moreover, they represent the structural part of the utility by a polynomial in hours and 
consumption. We use our data to estimate several versions of the model proposed by van Soest, Das 
and Gong (2002), and we make a detailed comparison with our model.  
 This paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present the model, which includes 
a characterization of the stochastic properties of the unobserved variables and the functional form of 
the deterministic part of the utility function of the agents. In Section 3 we discuss the relationship 
between previous labor supply models and  our model. In Section 4 we discuss empirical applications 
based on our model as well as on the model of van Soest, Das and Gong (2002).  
2. The modeling framework 
As alluded to above, the choice environment of a worker is assumed to consist of a set of latent job- 
and non-market opportunities. Each job is characterized by fixed observed attribute variables that 
represent the contract (wage rate) and unobserved attributes that describe the job-type. We shall first 
discuss the case where qualitative attributes are latent. Later, we extend the framework to 
accommodate sector-specific jobs (public sector versus private sector).  
2.1. Preferences and choice sets 
Let U(C,h,z) be the (ordinal) utility function of the household where C denotes household 
consumption, z indexes the market and non-market opportunities, or job-types, and h is hours of work 
of the married female. Let positive indices, z = 1 2, , ... ,  refer to market opportunities (jobs) and z 0=  
refer to the non-market alternative. To a market opportunity z, there are associated hours of work, 
H(z), and wage rate, W(z). How these are determined will be discussed later. The opportunity index z 
in the utility function accommodates the notion that workers may have preferences over job-types 
(which includes preferences for working in specific sectors of the economy) in addition to income and 
hours of work. For given hours and wage rate, h and w, the economic budget constraint is represented 
by 
(2.1) C f (hw, I)=  
where I is non-labor income, which includes the income of the husband, and f(⋅) is the function that 
transforms gross income into after-tax household income. Here, the income of the husband is treated 
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as given. The function f(⋅) will capture all details of the tax and benefit system. The price index for the 
composite good, C, is set equal to one. Our first assumption concerns the structure of the preferences. 
 
 Assumption 1 
 The utility function has the structure 
 U(C,h,z) (C,h) (z)= v ε  
for , , ,...,=z 0 1 2  where v(⋅) is a positive deterministic function and ε(z) is a positive random taste-
shifter. 
 
 The random taste-shifter is assumed to account for the unobservable individual 
characteristics and non-pecuniary job-type attributes that affect utility. For notational simplicity we 
will use the notation 
(2.2) ( )(h,w;I) v f (hw,I),h .ψ ≡  
The term ψ(h,w;I) is the representative utility of jobs with hours of work h and wage rate w, given 
non-labor income I. In addition to (2.1), there are restrictions on the set of feasible market 
opportunities a specific worker faces because there are job-types for which the worker is not qualified 
and there may not be jobs available for which she is qualified. 
2.2. A simplified description of the model 
Since the general model is based on a somewhat abstract representation of the unobserved 
heterogeneity in choice restrictions and preferences we shall first consider a simplified version. In this 
simplified version unobserved heterogeneity in the choice sets is ignored. Furthermore, it is assumed 
that the agent only can choose among a finite set of jobs. Let D(h,w) denote the agent’s set of 
available jobs with hours of work, H(z) h= , and wage rate W(z) w= . Let m(h,w) be the number of 
jobs in D(h,w). For the non-market alternative, ( )m 0,0 1= . The random error terms {ε(z)}, are 
assumed independent of offered hours and wages. 
 
 Assumption 2 
 The choice of an alternative (job, or the non-market alternative) from a given set of 
alternatives, satisfies the Independence form Irrelevant Alternatives property, (IIA). 
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 Recall that the underlying intuition of the IIA assumption is, loosely speaking, that the 
agent’s ranking of job opportunities from a subset B (say), within the choice set of feasible jobs with 
given job-specific hours of work and wage rates, does not change if the choice set of feasible jobs is 
altered. Recall also that the stochastic formulation of IIA adopted by the psychologists, means that this 
property only is claimed to hold on average, for an agent that is exposed to a large number of repeated 
choice experiments, cf. Thurstone (1927).  
 In Appendix A we demonstrate that IIA in fact seems to be less restrictive than the 
implications for constrained demand that follow from standard consumer theory. The reason why it is 
commonly believed that IIA is a very strong assumption is because it is rejected in some empirical 
tests3. Typically, these tests depend crucially on additional ad hoc hypotheses about functional form 
and parameters that are equal across the sample. Thus, what is typically tested are joint hypotheses 
about a combination of functional forms, equal parameters across individuals and IIA. For serious 
empirical tests of IIA it is therefore required to have detailed stated preference type of data at the 
individual level (which is beyond the scope of our article). It is in our view natural to use IIA as a 
basic postulate of individual probabilistic rationality. Recall that “probabilistic” may be related to the 
view that behavior is stochastic at the individual level in the sense that if an agent is exposed to 
repeated choice experiments he or she may choose different alternatives each time; see for example 
Tversky (1969). (Alternatively, “probabilistic” may be due to the fact that researchers are not able to 
observe all factors that affect the choices of the individuals). It is of crucial importance to be able to 
pin down a theoretically justified individual model, because otherwise we surely will not be able to 
identify the possible variation of model parameters across the sample. If we cannot separate the 
individual model structure from unobserved population heterogeneity we cannot test several 
interesting hypotheses about behavior and choice constraints. As mentioned in the introduction, in our 
empirical model specification (Section 4) we shall allow for random effects, which means that in the 
empirical application below IIA only is assumed to hold conditional on the random effect4. 
 Consider now the choice model. As is well known (Strauss, 1979), Assumption 2 implies 
that the random error terms {ε(z)} can, with no loss of generality, be assumed independent with c.d.f. 
                                                     
3 The fact that there is are few workers that are observed working with low hours of work may be also be interpreted as a 
result of fixed costs of working, as, van Soest, Das and Gong (2002) do. Fixed costs of working may imply that it is more 
attractive not to work than working few hours. Of course fixed costs of working may be of some importance, but in unionized 
economies like the Norwegian economy it is also a fact that jobs offered with few hours are rare.) 
4 A famous example often used to demonstrate how restrictive IIA is, is the so-called red bus-blue bus example (Debreu, 
1960). However, this example is rather extreme because two of the alternatives are practically identical. In most cases 
alternatives are fortunately different in a more essential way. It is true though that the alternatives in many cases can differ in 
varying degree with respect to common aspects, which may weaken the plausibility of IIA. Nevertheless, it is still not evident 
that different degree of substitutability between alternatives will yield violation of IIA on the individual level. If the 
stochastic elements of the utility function to a large extent represent bounded rationality, they can be viewed as pure “noise”, 
and therefore may not reflect substitution relations in a systematic way. 
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0),exp( 1 >− − xx 5. Note that the agent will be observed working h hours at wage rate w if she chooses 
a job within D(h,w). Let (h, w;I)ϕ  denote the probability that the agent shall choose a particular job 
with offered hours h and wage rate w, when her non-labor income is I. From standard results in 
discrete choice theory (McFadden, 1984) it now follows that the probability that a specific job z (say) 
within D(h,w) shall be the feasible job with the highest utility equals 
 ( ) ( )( )( )x,y k D(x,y)
x,y k D(x,y) x,y
(h,w;I) (h,w;I)P h,w;I (z) max max x, y;I (k) .
(x, y;I) (x, y;I)m(x, y)∈
∈
ψ ψψ ε = ψ ε = =ψ ψ∑ ∑ ∑  
The probability of choosing any job within D(h,w) is thus obtained by summing over all jobs in 
D(h,w), which yields 
(2.3) 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
( )
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
x,y k D(x,y)z D(h,w)
z D(h,w)
x,y z D(x,y) x,y
h,w;I P h,w;I (z) max max x, y;I (k)
h, w;I h, w;I m h,w
.
x, y;I x, y;I m x, y
∈∈
∈
∈
ϕ = ψ ε = ψ ε
ψ ψ= =ψ ψ
∑
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
 
The resulting expression is a choice model that is analogous to a multinomial logit model with 
representative utility terms ( ){ }h,w;Iψ  weighted with the frequencies of feasible jobs, ( ){ }m h,w  . 
Unfortunately, the frequencies ( ){ }m h,w  are not directly observable, but under specific assumptions 
one can identify m(h,w) and ( )h,w;Iψ  and estimate their parameters. We shall return to this issue 
below. 
2.3. The general case with stochastic choice sets 
In the simplified model version described above the choice sets, represented by ( ){ }D h,w , were 
assumed to be equal across observationally identical agents. It is however, desirable to allow choice 
sets also to vary across agents due to unobserved heterogeneity in opportunities. In this subsection we 
shall present a modeling framework that accommodates the notion of both observed and unobserved 
heterogeneity in opportunities and preferences. 
                                                     
5 The c.d.f. 1exp( x ), x 0−− > , occurs in this context because of the multiplicative specification of the utility function in 
Assumption 1. This c.d.f. is completely equivalent to the more familiar c.d.f xexp( e )−−  that occurs in the corresponding 
additive formulation. Recall that the standard type I distribution function has the form exp(-1/y), y>0, cf. Resnick (1987). In 
the statistical literature there is some confusion where some authors call this distribution type III. 
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 To this end we turn to discuss a particular representation of random choice sets through the 
set of triples ( ){ }H(z), W(z), (z) , z 1,2,...ε =  associated with the respective jobs. We shall assume that 
these triples are independent and randomly scattered in some suitable set Ω. This conforms with the 
intuition that due to the researcher's lack of information the locations of points in Ω appears to be 
independent. A convenient formal representation of this type of stochastic “process” is obtained 
through the multidimensional non-homogeneous spatial Poisson process. Recall that a Poisson process 
on Ω has the properties that its points are randomly scattered throughout Ω. If the Poisson process is 
homogeneous the points are randomly but evenly dispersed on Ω. In contrast, the non-homogeneous 
Poisson process allows for uneven distribution of points in the sense that there are, on average, higher 
concentration of points in some parts of Ω than in other parts. This allows us to account for the 
possibility that there may be fewer jobs available with high values of the taste shifters {ε(z)} than jobs 
with low values of {ε(z)}, and the possibility that there may be more jobs with full-time hours 
available than jobs with other hours of work. To facilitate exposition it may be convenient to explain 
the multidimensional Poisson process representation by first starting with the more familiar one-
dimensional Poisson process, namely the one that represents the taste-shifters { }ε( )z . Subsequently, 
we extend the process to higher dimensions by “assigning” further attributes (job-specific hours and 
wage rates) to the one-dimensional Poisson points.  
 
 Assumption 3 
 The taste-shifters ( ){ }=z , z 1,2,...ε  are realizations of a non-homogeneous Poisson process 
on (0,∞) with intensity κ(ε).  Moreover ( ){ }z , z 1,2,...ε =  are distributed independently of ε(0). 
 
 As mentioned above the points (taste-shifters) of the Poisson process are independent and 
randomly scattered, and the probability that there is a job with ( )(z) , dε ∈ ε ε + ε  is available to the 
individual equals κ(ε)dε. Moreover, the probability that there are more that one job with taste-shifters 
within ( ), dε ε + ε  is negligible. 
 
 Assumption 4 
 The hours of work and wage rates ( ) ( )( ) =H z ,W z ,z 1,2,...,  are i.i.d. with  joint density 
g(h,w), where < <0 h h  is an upper bound on hours of work. Moreover, ( ) ( )( ){ }=H z ,W z ,z 1,2,...,  
are independent of ( ){ }=z , z 0,1,2,...ε . 
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 From Assumptions 3 and 4 we realize that the points { }H(z),W(z), (z)ε  can be interpreted 
as realizations from a three-dimensional non-homogeneous Poisson process on Ω with intensity 
g(h,w)κ(ε). A formal proof of this is found in Resnick (1987), p.135. This intensity is a complete 
representation of the Poisson process in the sense that it governs the corresponding probability 
distribution of the Poisson points in Ω.  
 There are two different interpretations of the notion of random choice sets. In the first 
interpretation the randomness is viewed as a result of unobserved heterogeneity in choice 
opportunities across the population. That is, while the individual agent is viewed as having complete 
information about his choice set and the utilities of every feasible alternative, the researcher cannot 
observe this heterogeneity. He can at most account for heterogeneity in the choice set due to observed 
individual characteristics. Given the set of feasible jobs, g(h,w)dhdw can be interpreted as the 
probability (from the researcher’s point of view) that, for a randomly selected agent, there is a job with 
hours of work ( )H(z) h,h dh∈ +  and ( )W(z) w,w dw∈ +  that is feasible. The corresponding 
“empirical” counterpart is the fraction of the feasible jobs that have hours of work and wage rates 
within ( ) ( )h,h dh w,w dw+ × + .  
 The second interpretation is related to bounded rationality in the sense that the agent has 
difficulties with assessing the precise value to him of the respective alternatives and also has limited 
capacity to identify and take into account the exact choice set. The actual choice set she takes into 
account may therefore to some extent be a randomly “selected” (by the agent) subset from the 
“objective” choice set of feasible alternatives. This means that in replications of a choice experiment 
the agent may make different choices due both to differences in utility evaluations and differences in 
the subjectively “selected” choice set. Psychologists have often emphasized this second interpretation. 
The interpretation of g(h,w)dhdw in this setting is as the probability that the agent both consider a job 
with hours of work and wages that lies within ( ) ( )h,h dh w,w dw+ × + , and perceive this job as 
feasible. Most likely, the actual heterogeneity in the choice sets will be a combination of bounded 
rationality and unobserved heterogeneity. To which extent bounded rationality play a role can usually 
not be identified by the researcher. 
 From Assumptions 1, 3 and 4 it is now possible to derive choice probabilities of observed 
labor market choices. However, without further restrictions on the intensity of the Poisson process the 
expression for the choice probabilities will be rather general and complicated analytically. It thus is 
desirable to add further behavioral assumptions to restrict the modeling framework. Similarly to the 
simplified setup in Section 2.2 we shall assume IIA as given in Assumption 2.  
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 We are now ready to express the probability distribution of realized hours and wages, 
including the probability of not working. Let Φ(h,w;I) be the joint cumulative distribution of realized 
hours and wages that follow from utility maximizing behavior, i.e., 
(2.4) ( )( ) ( )( )z z
H(z) h, W(z) w
(h,w;I) P max H(z),W(z);I (z) max H(z),W(z);I (z) .
≤ ≤
⎛ ⎞Φ ≡ ψ ε = ψ ε⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  
Equation (2.4) defines the probability that the chosen opportunity (i.e. job) has hours of work less than 
or equal to h and wage rate less than or equal to w.  
 
 Theorem 1 
 Assume that Assumptions 1 to 4 hold. Assume furthermore that κ(ε) is continuous and that 
 ∫∞
x
dεεκ )( <∞, 
for >x 0 . Then ε(0) is type I extreme value distributed and the intensity κ(ε) has the form 2−θε , for 
positive ε where θ  is a positive constant. Moreover, the probability density ϕ(h,w;I) is given by 
(2.5) = ∫ ∫
D
(h,w;I )g(h,w)(h,w;I )
(0,0;I )+ (x, y;I )g(x, y)dx dy
ψ θϕ ψ θ ψ  
for h 0, w 0,> >  and 
(2.6) = ∫ ∫
D
(0,0;I )(0,0;I ) ,
(0,0;I )+ (x, y;I )g(x, y)dx dy
ψϕ ψ θ ψ  
for h w 0 ,= =  where ( )⎡ ⎤= × ∞⎣ ⎦D 0,h 0, . 
 
 The proof of Theorem 1 is given in Appendix B. 
 
 Recall that when ε(0) has type I extreme value c.d.f.., then 
 ( ) ( )1P (0) x exp x−ε ≤ = − , 
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for positive x. Furthermore, the parameter θ  that appears in the intensity κ(ε) is a measure of job-
availability since a high value of θ means that there is a high probability that there is an available job 
with taste-shifters belonging to ( ), dε ε + ε  for any positive ε. 
 To explain θ further, we may  consider the particular case where the agent perceives no 
constraints on behavior and the agent is, on average, indifferent between working and not working. This 
means that his utility of either alternative is governed by i.i.d. random terms. Clearly, in this case the 
probability of working should be equal to 0.5. The case with totally random preferences corresponds to 
the case with ( ) ( )h,w;I 0,0;Iψ = ψ  for all h and w. Hence, in this case (2.6) reduces to ( ) 10,0;I
1
ϕ = + θ . 
Thus, for ( )0,0;Iϕ  to be equal to 0.5, θ  must be equal to 1. Thus, 1 is the upper bound on θ, and θ equal 
to 1 can be interpreted as a reference case with no “quantity” restrictions on behavior. This case may 
cover that no involuntary unemployment is present.  
 So far, we have demonstrated that the formulation above allows for a particular type of 
quantity constraints, which typically are rather difficult to account for by means of the econometric 
formulations used in previous labor supply studies.  
Although we have assumed that the agent’s taste-shifters are (stochastically) independent of 
offered hours and wage rates, the opportunity density will depend on the distribution of the 
preferences due to equilibrium conditions. In other words, the market forces that regulate the balance 
between supply and demand, be it a market clearing regime or not, are assumed to operate solely on an 
aggregate level. The opportunity density will consequently depend on the production technology of the 
firms as well as of the contract and wage setting policies of the unions and the firms. It is beyond the 
scope of this paper to discuss fully how the opportunity density θg(⋅), through market equilibrium 
processes, depend on the systematic part of the utility function, ψ(⋅). This means that the estimated 
model only can be applied to simulate behavior conditional on the opportunity density. This parallels 
the assumptions made in previous labor supply models, in which it is assumed that the agents take 
wages as given and that the agent can freely choose between any hours of work. In Dagsvik (2000), it 
is discussed how an explicit equilibrium model version can be specified and how the opportunity 
density depends on workers’ preferences and firms’ technologies, and we shall use that framework to 
justify that the opportunity density is multiplicatively separable in hours and wage rates, which means 
that the offered hours and wage rates are independent. In Appendix C we show how this property 
follows from the setup in Dagsvik (2000), combined with the assumption of constant returns to scale 
production functions of the firms.  
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2.4. Identification 
Identification of the model given in (2.5) and (2.6) were considered in Dagsvik and Strøm (1997) 
under the assumption that the structural term of the utility function is multiplicatively separable in 
consumption and hours of work (leisure). However, here the assumption of a multiplicatively 
separable utility function will be relaxed. With a reference to the arguments given in Appendix C, we 
will instead consider identification when 
(2.7) ( ) 1 2g h,w g (w)g (h)=  
which means that hours and wage rates { }H(z)  and { }W(z)  offered by the firms are independent.  
 Let ( )0 0 0 0C ,h , I , h 0> , be fixed levels of consumption, hours of work and non-labor income, 
and let ( )C,h  be arbitrary values of consumption and hours. Moreover, let ( )1f C, I−  be the function 
determined by 
 ( )( )1f f C, I , I C− = . 
That is, ( )1f C, I−  is the level of labor income that corresponds to consumption C and non-labor 
income I when the budget constraint (2.1) holds. Let w0 and h be determined by 
 ( )10 0 0 0w f C , I h−=  
and 
 ( )1 0 0h f C,I w−= . 
Then it follows from (2.5), (2.7) and (2.2) that 
(2.8) ( )( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )( )
( )( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
0 0 20 0 0 0 2 2
0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 00 0 0 0 2 0
v f hw ,I ,h g (h)h,w ;I h,w ;I g (h) v C,h g (h)
h , w ;I h ,w ;I g h v C ,h g hv f h w ,I ,h g h
ϕ ψ= = =ϕ ψ . 
Eq. (2.8) demonstrates that for h 0>  one can identify ( ) 2v C,h g (h)  up to a multiplicative constant 
( ) ( )( )0 0 2 0v C ,h g h . This multiplicative constant is of course irrelevant since it does not affect 
comparisons of utility levels. Since ( ) 2v C,h g (h)  is identified it follows from (2.2) and (2.5) that 
(2.9) ( )( )1 2
h, w;Ig (w)
K(I) h, w;I g (h)
ϕ= ψ  
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where K(I) denotes the denominator of the right side of (2.5) divided by θ. By integrating both sides of 
(2.9) with respect to w, we get for h 0>  that K(I) is determined by 
(2.10) ( )( ) 2
h,w;I dw1
K(I) h,w;I g (h)
ϕ= ψ∫ . 
Hence g2(w) is uniquely determined by (2.9) and (2.10). Finally, since g1(w) and ( ) 2h,w;I g (h)ψ  are 
identified for h 0>  and K(I) is determined by (2.10) it follows from (2.5 and (2.6) that ( )v C,0 θ  is 
identified because 
(2.11) ( ) ( )( ) ( )v f 0, I ,00,0;I 0,0;I K(I)ψ = = ϕθ θ . 
If ( )( )v f 0, I ,0  is normalized to be equal to one for a suitable value of I we realize that also θ can be 
determined from (2.11). 
 We have thus demonstrated that ( ) 2v C,h g (h),θ  and g1(w) are non-parametrically identified.  
2.5. Functional form 
Current quantitative economic research often suffers from the lack of theoretical principles on which 
assumptions about functional form can be made. While elaborate and sophisticated theoretical models 
of behavior exist, such models are often not detailed enough to be useful for purposes other than 
qualitative predictions. The standard approach in empirical analyses is either to “let the data 
determine” functional forms within ad hoc selected parametric classes (including so-called flexible 
functional forms). This is clearly unsatisfactory in the context of structural modeling. In the preceding 
sections we have insisted on a theoretical foundation for the stochastic properties of our model based 
on IIA. These properties led to a particular representation of the labor supply choice probabilities 
((2.5) and (2.6)) in terms of functions that represent preferences and opportunities. However, unless 
we also are able to justify the choice of functional form of the systematic part of the utility function 
and the opportunity distribution, the implications may, as regards structural empirical analyses, be 
ambiguous. This is due to the fact that the class of a priori admissible opportunity distributions and 
utility functions is very large6. In this section we shall discuss some interesting implications from the 
theory of psychophysical measurement and dimensionality analysis. The point of departure taken and 
                                                     
6 The following passage by Frisch (1932) is a good example of a balanced view about the merits and limitations of a purely 
statistical approach:.. “No statistical technique, however refined, will ever be able to do such a thing (solve the problem of 
testing “significance”). The ultimate test of significance must consist in a network of conclusions and cross checks where 
theoretical economic consideration, intimate and realistic knowledge of the data and refined statistical technique concur.” 
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exploited in some of the literature of psychophysical measurement is that numerical representations of 
sensory perceptions and physical stimuli can only be measured up to a scale7. For example, if the 
relevant stimuli are quantities or money, this type of variables are measured on a ratio scale. There is 
by now a considerable literature that addresses the issue of meaningfulness and dimensional 
invariance of scientific laws. We shall apply a typical approach within the field of psychophysics, as 
presented in Falmagne (1985), to restrict the class of functional forms for the systematic part of the 
utility function. 
 To this end, consider the particular case with an opportunity distribution that has all mass in 
two points ( )h w, 1  and ( )h w, 2 , with probability mass equal to 0.5 in either point. (Since preferences 
are assumed independent of opportunities, the analyst is, for the sake of interpretation and theoretical 
analysis, free to select any opportunity distribution he finds suitable for a specific purpose while 
keeping the function v(⋅) unchanged). Let L denote leisure defined as total time available for work 
minus hours of work. Then from (2.5) it follows that we can write 
(2.12) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
1 1
1 1 2 2
1 1 2 2
v C ,h
C ,L ;C ,L
v C ,h v C ,h
≡ ϕ+ %  
where ( )1 1 2 2C ,L ;C ,Lϕ%  is the probability that ( )1 1C ,L  is preferred to ( )2 2C ,L . It is understood that 
consumption in this context means disposable income minus subsistence expenditure and leisure 
means leisure minus subsistence leisure. 
 
 Assumption 5 
 Suppose C1, C2, *1C , 
*
2C , L1, L2, are such that 
 ( ) ( )≤% % * *1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2C ,L ;C ,L C ,L ;C ,L .ϕ ϕ  
Then 
 ( ) ( )≤% % * *1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2r C ,L ;r C ,L r C ,L ;r C ,Lϕ ϕ  
for any positive r. 
 
                                                     
7 Recall that the scale types are: Ordinal scale, Ratio scale, Interval scale and Logarithmic interval scale, cf. Falmagne (1985). 
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 Assumption 5 states that if the fraction of workers that prefer jobs that yield ( )1 1C ,L  to jobs 
that yield ( )2 2C ,L  is less than the fraction of workers that prefer jobs that yield ( )*1 1C ,L  to jobs that 
yield ( )*2 2C ,L , then the same is true when the respective consumption levels are scale transformations 
of the original levels. Recall that the non-pecuniary characteristics of the jobs are represented by 
random terms that are independent of the systematic terms ( ){ }v C,h . Assumption 5 captures the 
notion that once basic needs (subsistence) are fulfilled, then the absolute levels of quantities tend not 
to be essential, rather the individuals relate to relative consumption levels. Note, however, that 
Assumption 5 does not claim that ( )1 1 2 2r C ,L ;r C ,Lϕ%  is independent of r. It only expresses that if the 
number of individuals that prefer ( )*1 1C ,L  to ( )*2 2C ,L  is greater than the number of individuals that 
prefer ( )1 1C ,L  to ( )2 2C ,L , this inequality remains true when consumption levels are increased or 
decreased by the same factor. For the sake of understanding the limitation of Assumption 5, we can 
think of two objections against this assumption. One objection is that the individual’s perception about 
his personal subsistence level may be somewhat vague and may not be identified by a single fixed 
amount. Rather it may vary from one moment to the next according to fluctuations in his mood and 
state of mind. Another objection is related to satiation. If satiation is present and *1rC  and 
*
2rC  are 
close to satiation levels for sufficiently large r and 1 2L L L= =  (which means that the deterministic 
part of the utility approaches a constant), the second inequality in Assumption 5 may be reversed 
because ( )* *1 2rC ,L;rC ,Lϕ%  will be close to 0.5, independent of the levels of * *1 2C , C  and L. In the 
absence of satiation it seems to us to be highly unreasonable that the inequality 
( ) ( )* *1 1 1 2 1 1 2 2C ,L ;C ,L C ,L ;C ,Lϕ ≤ ϕ% %  should be reversed if the consumption levels are rescaled; i.e., that 
Assumption 5 is violated. 
 The notion that relative stimuli levels matter rather than absolute ones is supported by 
numerous stated preference experiments, see for example Stevens (1975). 
 
 Assumption 6 
 Suppose * *1 2 1 2 1 2L , L , L , L ,C ,C ,  are such that 
 ( ) ( ).≤% % * *1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2C ,L ;C ,L C ,L ;C ,Lϕ ϕ  
Then 
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 ( ) ( )≤% % * *1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2C ,rL ;C ,rL C ,rL ;C ,rLϕ ϕ  
for any positive r. 
 
 We realize that Assumption 6 is completely analogous to Assumption 5 and thus the 
motivation is similar.8 
 
 Theorem 2 
 Assume that (2.12), Assumptions 5 and 6 hold with v(C,h) continuous and strictly increasing 
in C and strictly decreasing in h. Then 
(2.13) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )v α α α αβ β βα α α α− − − −= + +
1 2 1 2
1 2 3
1 2 1 2
C 1 L 1 C 1 L 1
log C,h  
where { }jα  and { }jβ  are constants with > =j 0, j 1,2β ,β3 can be negative. 
 
 A proof of Theorem 2 is given in Appendix B.  
 
 If one imposes the stronger assumption that ( )1 1 2 2r C ,L ; r C ,Lϕ%  is independent of r 0> , it 
can easily be demonstrated that this implies that 1 0α = . If one imposes the assumption that 
( )1 1 2 2r C ,s L ;r C ,sLϕ%  is independent of r and s, for all r 0> , s 0> , it is easily seen that this yields 
that 1 2 3 0α = α = β =  so that (2.13) reduces to 
(2.14) ( ) 1 2log v C,h logC log L= β + β  
which is the well known Stone Geary utility function. (Recall that C and L are defined as consumption 
and leisure minus the respective subsistence levels.) 
                                                     
8 Although Luce (1959b) derived the power law as the functional relation between subjective continua and physical continua 
from the assumption of dimensional invariance, his approach nor Steven's empirical method do not apply directly to 
aggregate relations. Recall that the challenge faced here is to characterize choice probabilities, or equivalently, the 
mathematical and stochastic structure of a random utility function. If only the approach discussed by Luce (1959b) was 
available, then we would not be able to discriminate between specifications such as for example 1v (C) C
α= β  and 
( )1v (C) m C ,α=  where m(⋅) is an increasing function since in our context, utility, U(C,h,z), is ordinal and only determined 
up to a monotone transform. Thanks to the approach developed by Falmagne and Narens (cf. Falmagne, 1985, ch. 14) we are, 
however, able to get rather sharp results as demonstrated above. 
19 
 There is a number of studies in experimental psychophysics that are concerned with the 
measurement of the utility of income. Consistent with the result of Theorem 2, Stevens (1975) and his 
followers have found that a power function fits the data well,9 cf. Stevens (1975), p. 246. See also 
Breault (1981). 
 The result of Theorem 2 does not depend on the particular form of ( )ϕ ⋅%  given in (2.12). In 
fact, it can easily be verified that it is enough to assume that ϕ%  has the form 
(2.15) ( ) ( )( )
1 1
1 1 2 2
2 2
v C ,h
C ,L ;C ,L F
v C ,h
⎛ ⎞ϕ = ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
%  
where F is any strictly increasing c.d.f. on R+. This is so because the proof does not depend on the 
form of F(·). 
2.6. Extension to several sectors 
An essential motivation for the framework discussed in this paper is that it is particularly convenient 
for modeling workers’ choice among jobs with observable non-pecuniary job attributes. In general, 
jobs in different sectors may differ with respect to job non-pecuniary attributes, such as job-security 
(with the government sector at one extreme, and private export industries at the other) and the nature 
of the tasks to be performed. 
 In this section we shall outline how the model can be extended to a multi-sectoral setting. To 
this end, we now suppose that the agent can choose among n sectors. The utility function in this case is 
assumed to have the structure 
(2.16) ( ) ( )j jU C,h, j, z v C,h (z)= ε  
where j indexes sector, j 0,1,...,n= , and j 0=  represents “not working”, and ( )jv C,h  is the 
representative utility of consumption and hours of work (C,h) and working in sector j. In this setting 
Assumption 3 is extended to involve sector specific densities gj(h,w) where gj(h,w) represents the joint 
distribution of the feasible hours of work and wage rates in sector j. Also the Poisson process 
representation of the job opportunities is allowed to be sector-specific with sector-specific parameter θj 
associated with the intensity of the taste-shifters of the Poisson processes. Thus, ( )jg h,w dh dw  is the 
mean fraction of feasible jobs in sector j with offered hours of work and wage rates within 
                                                     
9 Stevens and others have observed the power law in innumerable experiments. Sinn (1983) has compressed the content of 
Stevens' Psychophysical power law into the following statement: “Equal relative changes in stimulus intensity bring about 
equal relative changes in sensation intensity”. 
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( ) ( )h,h dw w,w dw+ × + . Let ( ) ( )( )j jh, w;I v f hw,I ,hψ = , ),0),I,0(f(v)I;0,0(ψ =  and let 
( )j h,w dh dwϕ  denote the probability of choosing a job in sector j with hours of work and wage rate 
within ( ) ( )h,h dw w,w dw+ × + . Similarly to Theorem 1 it follows that 
(2.17) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
j j j
j n
k k k
k 1 D
h,w;I g h,w
h,w;I
0,0;I x, y;I g x, y dx dy
=
ψ θϕ =
ψ + θ ψ∑ ∫∫
 
for h 0, w 0> > , and 
(2.18) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )n k k k
k 1 D
0,0;I
0,0;I
0,0;I x, y;I g x, y dx dy
=
ψϕ =
ψ + θ ψ∑ ∫∫
. 
3.  Relation to studies with discrete choice and latent constraints 
on hours of work 
For the sake of comparison with some recent studies in labor supply econometrics that discuss modeling 
strategies for dealing with constraints, consider for a moment the following setting: The agent has a utility 
function ~( , , )U C h ε  where ε is a random taste-shifter (independent of (C,h)). The budget constraint is 
given by (2.1) and the offered wage rate is fixed for each agent. Assume that hours of work take values in 
a finite set B (say). Let 
(3.1) ( )V h w U f hw I h( , , ) ~ ( , ), , .ε ε=  
Then it follows that the probability density of hours, conditional on the wage rate and the set B, is 
given by 
(3.2) ( )$ , ( , , ) max ( , , ) .ϕ ε εh w B P V h w V x w
x B
≡ =⎛⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟∈  
Suppose now that B is unobserved by the analyst and can take any value in the set { }1 2 KB ,B ,...,B .  For 
example B could consist of the options “full-time”, “part-time” and “not working”, or of “part-time” and 
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“not working”. To account for this, assume that B is random. Let qj be the probability that B Bj= .  The 
unconditional probability density that corresponds to the data the analyst has at hand therefore equals10 
(3.3) ( ) ( )$ $ , ( , , ) max ( , , ) .ϕ ϕ ε εh w E h w B q P V h w V x wB j
B h
x B
j
j
≡ = =⎛⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟⊃ ∈∑  
In (3.3) it is the quantity “hours of work” that is rationed, whereas in our model, presented in section 2 
above, a latent choice variable, “job opportunity”, is introduced. In the model developed in section 2, 
possible rationing of hours may occur because there may be few or no feasible jobs with the desired hours 
of work. The models developed by Ilmakunnas and Pudney (1990), and Dickens and Lundberg (1993) fall 
within the framework represented by (3.3). 
 In contrast, our notion of unobservable job opportunities introduced in section 2 allows for the 
interpretation that the outcome of an agent's labor supply decision is the result of the agent maximizing 
utility over “job-packages” with several attributes of which hours of work is only one of them. Second, 
our framework is convenient for dealing with latent opportunity sets, while the type of formulation 
represented by (3.3) is a mixture of multinomial logit type densities and becomes rapidly intractable when 
K increases. 
 Van Soest (1994) on the contrary, assumes that the choice set consists of a finite (given) 
number of hours of work options and he specifies a model, which is a mixture of logit-type models 
across unobservable taste-shifters. He interprets the observed concentrations of hours of work as 
resulting from agents having strong preferences for “full-time” and/or “part-time” hours of work. In 
van Soest, Das and Gong (2002) they use a similar framework as van Soest (1994) but with different 
functional form assumptions11. The model of van Soest et al. (2002) can in fact be interpreted as a version 
of the simplified modeling framework described in Section 2.2, extended to include a particular random 
effect. To realize this, consider formula (2.3). Note that when the set D(h,w) of feasible jobs with hours 
and wage rates equal to (h,w) is independent of h, we obtain that the conditional choice model, given that 
the wage rate of the chosen job is equal to w, becomes 
(3.4) ( ) ( )( )
x,y
h, w;I m(w)
h,w;I
x, y;I m(y)
ψϕ = ψ∑ . 
                                                     
10 The notation 
j
B h ,⊃  means that the summation takes place across all j for which 
j
B h.⊃  
11 Van Soest (1994) argues that one may assume that the peak at full time hours are due to preferences, since possible 
constraints on hours are unobserved. This argument will in general be flawed, because if in fact there are restrictions on hours 
of work then this may have important implications for the structural model. That it is not evident how one should deal with 
choice constraints is illustrated by the other contributions mentioned in this section. 
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where, according to Section 2.2, m(w) is the number of jobs with wage rate w. The interpretation is that 
all hours of work are equally feasible in the market. Hence, the conditional density of hours, given the 
wage rate of the chosen job, ( )h;w,Iϕ% , equals 
(3.5) ( ) ( )( )
( )
( )
x x
h, w;I h,w;I
h;w, I
x, w;I x,w;I
ϕ ψϕ ≡ =ϕ ψ∑ ∑% . 
Due to Weierstrass theorem any continuous function can be approximated arbitrarily closely by 
polynomials. This result motivates van Soest, Das and Gong (2002) to approximate logv(C,h) by a 
polynomial of a suitable degree in consumption and hours of work. Other details of their empirical 
specification will be discussed below when we compare the results of the empirical analysis on 
Norwegian data based on our model versus the model used by van Soest, Das and Gong (2002). 
4. An empirical application 
4.1. Empirical specification 
In this application we only consider the case with two sectors, private and public sector, and for the 
following reasons. For women with higher level of education there are more job opportunities in the 
public than in the private sector. Moreover, in the Norwegian public sector more emphasis has been put 
on facilitating combination of work and childcare, and thus one is more likely to find a job with a 
subsidized day-care center in the public than in the private sector. The public sector is more unionized 
than the private sector. Wages are more compressed and hours are more constrained. However, the job 
security tends to be higher in the public sector than in the private sector. Finally, some job types are 
almost only found in the public sectors (such as hospitals, colleges and universities) while others are 
found solely in the private sector (a large number of manufacturing firms). Thus, there are important 
differences between the private and the public sector that could influence the labor supply decisions of 
married women. Some of these differences are observed (like wages) while others are not. The modeling 
framework appropriate for this application is the one outlined in subsection 2.6, where sector one is the 
public sector and sector two is the private sector and n 2= . 
 As outlined above and justified in Appendix C, we will assume that offered hours and 
offered wages are independent, i.e. 
(4.1) j j1 j2g (h,w) g (w)g (h)=  
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for j 1,2= . Although offered wages and hours may vary across jobs, our assumption is that hours are 
set independent of wages. The justification for this assumption is that offered wages, in the unionized 
part of economy, are set in yearly wage settlements. Normal working hours, on the other side, are 
determined more infrequently, typically once or twice every decade. The density of offered hours, 
( )j2g h , is assumed uniform except for peaks at full-time and part-time hours. Recall that uniformly 
distributed offered hours corresponds to the notion of a perfect competitive economy. Thus, the full-
time peak in the hours distribution captures institutional restrictions and technological constraints and 
hence market imperfections in the economy. We allow the sizes of the full-time and part-time peaks to 
vary across sectors. The rationale is that the public sector is more regulated than the private sector, 
also because the private sector is more heterogeneous and less unionized. Thus we expect the full-time 
peaks associated with the public sector to be higher than the full-time peak associated with the private 
sector. Note also that normal working hours may vary across jobs according to how strenuous the jobs 
are considered to be. For example nurses, fire-workers and police officers have typically lower normal 
working hours than the average worker.  
 To facilitate estimation, we have assumed that the choice set of hours is discrete. For each sector 
we have specified 7 hours of work intervals. The medians of the intervals range from 420 annual hours in 
the first interval to 2808 in the 7th interval. For each sector the full-time peak occurs in the 5th interval 
where the median is 1950 annual hours. The part-time peak is related to the 3rd interval with a median 
equal to 1040 annual hours. These intervals correspond to the most common agreements of what 
constitutes full time and half time annual hours of work. 
 In section 2.3 we postulated particular invariance properties that allowed us to characterize 
the functional form of the structural part of the utility function. Unfortunately, we have not been able 
to provide similar principle to characterize the functional form of j1g (w) . Recall that j1g (w)  is the 
subjective density of offered wage rates, as perceived by the agent. We shall therefore, in the present 
application, abandon the specification and estimation of j1g (w) , which implies that we can only 
estimate the marginal density of chosen hours of work and sector. 
 Assume next that 
(4.2) ( ) ( )j jv C,h v C,h= µ  
where µj is a positive term that represents the pure average utility of working in sector j. Hence, we 
can write ( ) ( )j jh,w;I h,w;Iψ = ψ µ . 
 Let jw  be the subjective mean in the offered wage rate distribution in sector j, i.e., 
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(4.3) j j1
y 0
w yg (y)dy
>
= ∫ . 
By the mean value theorem we have that 
(4.4) ( ) ( )j1 j
y 0
h, y;I g (y)dy h,w ;I
>
ψ ≅ ψ∫ . 
The approximation in (4.3) is good if the variance in the subjective opportunity density gj1(w) is small. 
 To allow for unobserved heterogeneity in the opportunity densities we assume that 
(4.5) *j j jw w= η  
for j 1,2= , where { }jη  are random effects. We assume that jlog , j 1,2η = , are independent and 
normally distributed, ( )jN 0,σ . 
The systematic term of the subjective mean wage rate, *jw , is assumed to vary across sectors 
and *jlog w  is assumed to be a linear function of length of schooling, experience and work experiences 
squared. Let j j jb ≡ µ θ . Unless we assume that µj = 1 we cannot identify θj. The restriction µj = 1 
means that, ceteris paribus, the average value of non-market and market non-pecuniary attributes do 
not differ across sectors and the non-market state. We have also experimented with random effects 
associated with the terms bj, and with the coefficient associated with leisure in the systematic part of 
the utility function. 
 Thus, when accounting for the unobserved heterogeneity, it follows from (2.12), (2.13) and 
(4.2) to (4.5) that the resulting choice probabilities that correspond to our observations are 
(4.6) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
*
j j j2 j* *
j 1 2 * *
1 1 1 12 2 2 2 22
x 0 x 0
h,w ;I g (h)b
h;w ,w ,I E ,
0,0;I b x,w ;I g (x) b x, w ;I g (x)
> >
⎡ ⎤ψ η⎢ ⎥ϕ = ⎢ ⎥ψ + ψ η + ψ η⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∑ ∑
 
for h 0> , j 1,2= , and 
(4.7) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )* *1 2 * *1 1 1 12 2 2 2 22
x 0 x 0
0,0;I
0;w ,w ,I E ,
0,0;I b x,w ;I g (x) b x,w ;I g (x)
> >
⎡ ⎤ψ⎢ ⎥ϕ = ⎢ ⎥ψ + ψ η + ψ η⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∑ ∑
  
where expectation is taken with respect to the random effects. 
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 For many reasons, most women are working in the service branch of the economy and thus 
for women there are more feasible jobs available in firms that provide services than elsewhere. In 
Norway, most of the services are provided by the public sector (health services, education etc) and 
many of the jobs here require higher education, while the services provided in the private sector say, in 
retail sale, are typically based on low-skill labor. Thus it is reasonable to assume that θj may depend 
on education. Also µj may depend on education. We will expect that the higher the education is, the 
higher is the number of feasible jobs in the public sector. To this end we have assumed that 
(4.8) j j1 j2log b f f S= +  
where S is the length of education. 
 We have chosen log v( )⋅  to be of the form given in Theorem 2. 
(4.9)   
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
31
31
4
00 2
2 4 5 6 7 8
1 3
4
0 0
9
1 3
L L 1[10 (C C )] 1log v(C,h) log A (log A) CU6 CO6
[ ]10 C C 1 L L 1
αα−
αα−
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ − −− − ⎜ ⎟= α +⎜ ⎟ α + α + α + α + α⎜ ⎟α α⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞− − − −⎜ ⎟+ α ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟α α⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
 
where A, is the age of the married woman, CU6 and CO6 are the number of children less than 6 and 
above 6 years, C is given by ( )I,hwf , L is leisure, defined as  
(4.10) 0L L 1 h 3640,− = −  
and j , j 1,2,...,8α = , are unknown parameters. Observe that we have subtracted from total annual hours 
a “subsistence” level, amounting to 5120 hours, which allows for sleep and rest. This corresponds to 
about 14 hours per day reserved for sleep and rest.  
 Consistent with psychophysical evidence, we have also introduced a subsistence threshold 
level, C0 for consumption in the v(⋅) function. We have chosen C0 to be close to the official estimate of 
a subsistence level in Norway (NOK 60 000). C is measured as the sum of the annual wage income of 
the woman and her husband after tax, household capital income after tax and child allowances. The tax 
functions and the child allowances are given in Appendix F.  
 If 1 3 21, 1, 0,α < α < α >  and 
(4.11) ( )24 5 6 7 8log A log A CU6 CO6 0α + α + α + α + α > , 
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α9 is positive, or if negative, sufficiently small numerically, then log ( )h,Cv  is increasing in C, 
decreasing in ( )h  for fixed C and strictly concave in ( )h,C . 
 To facilitate the estimation procedure we have estimated the wage equation (regressed log 
*
jw against the observed covariates mentioned above) in a first step by applying a version of the two 
stage Heckman approach to control for selectivity, see Appendix D. Conditional on these estimates the 
remaining parameters of the model are estimated by the maximum likelihood procedure.  
 As regards the random effects associated with b1 and b2 we have tried two several types of 
specifications. First we tried to specify the pair (f11, f21) in (4.8) as distributed according to a discrete 
binomial distribution, which can take two values with probabilities q and 1−q (say). The second type is 
based on the assumption that (f11, f21) is normally distributed. In addition, we have also estimated a 
specification where α4 in (4.9) is assumed to be a normally distributed random effect. 
4.2. Data 
Data on the labor supply of married women in Norway used in this study consists of a merged sample 
from “Survey of Income and Wealth, 1994”, Statistics Norway (1994) and “Level of living conditions, 
1995”, Statistics Norway (1995). Data covers married couples as well as cohabiting couples with 
common children. The age of the spouses ranges from 25 to 64. None of the spouses are self-
employed and none of them are on disability or other type of benefits. All taxes paid are observed and 
in the assessment of disposable income, at hours not observed, all details of the tax system are 
accounted for. Observed hours of work are related to main job as well as possible side jobs. In 1994 
the unemployment rate was rather low by international standard. Thus, for that reason it may be of 
little importance to employ desired hours (which we don’t have) instead of actual hours. The size of 
the sample used in estimating the labor supply model is 824. Wage rates above NOK 350 or below 
NOK 40 are not utilized when estimating the wage equations. The wage rates are computed as the 
ratio of annual wage income to hours worked. When computing annual wage income we take into 
account that some women have multiple jobs.  
 In Table 1 we report the summary statistics for the sample used in estimating the labor 
supply model. 
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Table 1. Summary statistics for married women in the sample, Norway 1994 
Not working Public sector Private sector  
Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std 
Age in years 40.44 9.92 41.24 8.68 38.68 9.08 
Education in years 11.02 2.01 12.36 2.34 10.88 1.62 
No of children, 0-6 0.73 0.83 0.44 0.74 0.63 0.81 
No of children, 7-17 1.00 1.01 0.75 0.86 0.53 0.80 
Annual hours of work 0 0 1641 489 1570 571 
Disposable household 
income, NOK per year 322 131 200 684 329 064 122 616 331 354 125 754 
Wage rate, NOK per 
hours   104.30 28.52 100.56 30.46 
Number of 
observations 66 405 353 
Fractions 0.080 0.492 0.428 
 
 From Table 1 we observe that the participation rate is rather high, 92 percent. In the first 
place the overall participation rate among married women is very high in Norway, actually in 1994 it 
was the highest in the world. Second, as mentioned above, we have made a selection with respect to 
age, health status, etc, which contribute to increase the participation rate further. We note that the 
mean wage is slightly higher in the public sector than in the private sector, whereas the wage 
dispersion tends to be higher in the private sector than in the public sector. 
4.3. Estimation results for the wage equations 
In this section we report estimates of the wage equation. 
 
Table 2. Estimates of wage equations. single and married women, Norway 1994 
Public sector Private sector  
Variables Estimates t-values Estimates t-values 
Constant  3.37 13.5  3.70 25.2 
Experience in years/100  3.21   6.0  2.55   5.1 
(Experience in years/100)2 -4.75 -5.3 -3.80 -4.2 
Education in years/100  5.57   4.9  5.26   4.2 
Log (Probability of working 
in the chosen sector) -0.12 -2.0 0.06 0.9 
Variance 0.059 18.6 0.075 17.0 
No of observations 691 580 
R2 0.14 0.08 
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 The wage equation is specified in a conventional way, i.e., the logarithm of observed wage 
rates, klog W , k 1,2= , is assumed to depend linearly on experience, experience squared, education 
level. Experience is defined as age minus years of schooling minus six. To control for the possibility 
of selectivity we have used a simpler model than the structural model developed above. The main 
reason for this is that our sample used to estimate the wage equations consists of married and 
unmarried women, while the model above is only postulated for married women. From the simplified 
modeling approach adopted in this section it can be demonstrated that one can control for selectivity 
bias by applying jlog P  as an additional independent variable where Pj is the probability of being in 
sector j, j 0,1,2= , (where j 0=  means not working). The details of this approach are given in 
Appendix D. Estimates of the wage equations are given in Table 2, and we observe that on the margin 
workers get slightly better paid for experience and education in the public sector than in the private 
sector. However, the differences in returns across sectors are not significant. On a much larger sample 
Barth and Røed (2001) reports similar results for 1995. 
 Judged by R2 the explanatory power of the wage equations is low. Thus, it seems important 
to account for unobservables in the wage equation when estimating the structural model. In Section 
4.1 we have explained how we account for the unobservables in the wage equations. We note that the 
estimated variance related to the random effects in wages tend to be higher in the private than in the 
public sector.  
4.4 Estimates of labor supply probabilities 
Estimates of the parameters in the structural choice model are given in the two first number columns 
of Table 3. Both exponents (α1 and α3) are significantly below 1 and the estimates thus imply that the 
deterministic part of the utility function is quasi-concave. We note that the parameter associated with 
the interaction term between consumption and leisure is significantly different from zero and negative. 
Hence, we can reject the hypothesis that the deterministic part of the utility function is additively 
separable in consumption and leisure.  
 Marginal utilities of consumption and leisure (for all relevant age of the women) are both 
positive. The latter depends significantly on age and number of children. Marginal utility of leisure is a 
convex function of age, with marginal utility increasing with age after 31-32 years of age. Marginal 
utility of leisure is positively affected by number of children. We observe that the number of young 
and “old” children has the same impact on the marginal utility of leisure. It is interesting to note that 
when the women are young and have children this reduces their incentive to participate in labor 
market activities, and when they are older and without children the age effects gradually also reduces 
their incentives to participate in labor market activities. 
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 The exponent 1α is significantly different from zero, which means that agents do not only 
care about relative consumption levels (beyond subsistence). Absolute levels also matter. The 
exponent 3α is almost not significantly different from zero (at a 5 per cent level or less), which means 
that the deterministic part of the utility function is close to being log-linear in leisure.  
 The estimates of the opportunity density confirm the conjecture that there are more jobs 
available in the public sector for higher educated women than for women with lower education. This 
means that if length of schooling is increased while wage rates are kept fixed, participation in the 
public sector will increase. In the private sector education does seem to have the opposite effect. At 
first glance this seems to indicate that highly educated women tend to be “overqualified” in the private 
sector. However, this may also be due to a preference effect: If preferences depend on schooling such 
that highly educated women tend to prefer jobs in the public sector (university, etc.) this would imply 
that b2 is decreasing in S.  
 Moreover, the full-time peak is more distinct in the public sector than in the private. As 
mentioned above, this may be due to the fact that the public sector is more unionized than the private 
one. 
 It turned out to be very difficult to estimate the random effects associated with b1 and b2. We 
have tried a discrete binomial-and the normally distributed random effects specifications and both 
yielded degenerate results. Also, we were not able to estimate specifications base on discrete 
distribution with more that two support points. Although we cannot rule out the possibility that other 
types of random effects may exist, we nevertheless think our estimation result indicate that it is likely 
that any random effect is negligible.   
 Analogous to van Soest et al. (2002) we have also tried to include a random effect in the 
leisure term of the utility function. Similarly to van Soest et al. we find that the t-value of the random 
effect is practically equal to zero.  
 The number of random draws for each random component in the wage equations equals 50. 
Thus, because there are two random components the total number of draws used in the simulations to 
compute the likelihood function equals 2500. 
 Table 4 compares observed and predicted aggregates, and we note that the model predicts 
these aggregates pretty well. In Figure 1 we show the observed fractions and predicted probabilities 
across the different hours of work categories (category 1, is not working, categories 2-8 are public 
sector and 9-15 are private sector). We observe that our model predicts very well the observed 
frequencies.  
 As noted above, we can in general only identify the product ( ) j2v C,h g (h)  non-
parametrically. To disentangle v2(h) from g2(h) we have assumed that the clustering of hours of work 
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at part-time and full-time work is due to technological organizational constraints and/or regulation of 
hours introduced by unions and/or the government. The term gj2(h) is meant to capture this aspect of 
the labor market in the highly unionized Norwegian economy. Thus, through parametric identification 
our model implies that observed concentration of hours of work around part-time and full-time work 
arise because there are institutional constraints in the labor market rather than because individuals 
have strong preferences for full-time and part-time hours of work. If the parameters of the utility 
function are robust with respect to our assumption, then our empirical model may be applied also to 
simulate the impact of a change in the institutional constraints on available working hours in the 
market. 
 To contrast our approach with the more familiar one with uniformly distributed offered hours we 
have re-estimated the model under the assumption that offered hours is uniformly distributed. It goes 
without saying that the parameters attached to the leisure term will be affected when we force the 
clustering of hours to be explained solely by preferences. Of greater interest is how the estimates of 
the other parameters of the utility function are affected when offered hours are assumed to be 
uniformly distributed. In the third and fourth number columns of Table 3 the estimates for this case are 
reported. We note that the parameters in the sector- specific opportunity densities remain unchanged. 
The exponent of the leisure term  is significantly different from zero and negative when offered hours 
are uniformly distributed. The numerical value is higher when offered hours are uniformly distributed 
compared to the case with full-time and part-time peaks. This is natural, because when the clustering 
of hours is due to spikes in the distribution of offered hours, labor supply responses to marginal wage 
changes becomes weak, given a full time job. As in the preceding case marginal utility of leisure is 
positive for all relevant ages and marginal leisure is at a minimum for the same age as before, around 
32 years of age. It is important to note that if offered hours are not uniformly distributed, which there 
is good reason to believe, then a change in this institutional constraint will be misinterpreted as a shift 
in the preferences of leisure in the model based on the assumption of uniformly distributed offered 
hours. 
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Table 3. Estimation results for the parameters of the labor supply probabilities 
 Uniformly distributed offered hours with part-time 
and fulltime peaks   
 
Uniformly 
distributed 
offered hours 
Variables Parameters Estimates t-values Estimates t-values 
Preferences:    
Consumption:      
Exponent α1   0.64  7.6   0.54   6.0 
Scale   10-4 α2   1.77  4.2 3.16   4.0 
Subsistence level C0 in 
NOK per year  60 000  60000  
Leisure:      
Exponent α3  -0.53 -2.1 -1.88 -5.1 
Constant α4 111.66  3.2 40.92   2.5 
Log age α5  -63.61 -3.2 -22.50 -2.5 
(log age)2 α6   9.20  3.3   3.23   2.5 
# children 0-6 α7   1.27  4.0   0.43   2.9 
# children 7-17 α8   0.97  4.1   0.30   2.7 
Consumption and 
Leisure, interaction α9 -0.12 -2.7 -1.52 -1.9 
Subsistence level of 
leisure in hours per year  5120  5120  
The parameters b1 and b2; +j j1 j2logb f f S=     
Constant, public sector 
(sector 1)   f11 -4.20 -4.7 -4.87 -5.4 
Constant, private sector 
(sector 2)   f21 1.14 1.0 -0.02 -0.1 
Education, public sector 
(sector 1) f12 0.22 2.9 0.24 3.1 
Education, private 
sector (sector 2) f22 -0.34 -3.3 -0.26 -2.8 
Opportunity density of Offered hours, gk2(h), k=1,2    
Full-time peak, public 
sector (sector 1)* ( ) ( )( )12 Full 12 0log g h g h  1.58 11.8   
Full-time peak, private 
sector (sector 2) ( ) ( )( )22 Full 22 0log g h g h  1.06 7.4   
Part-time peak, public 
Sector ( ) ( )( )12 Part 12 0log g h g h  0.68 4.4   
Part-time peak, private 
Sector ( ) ( )( )22 Part 22 0log g h g h  0.80 5.2   
# observations  824 824 
Log likelihood  -1760.9 -1862.0 
* The notation h0 refers to an arbitrary level of hours of work different from full-time and part-time 
 hours. 
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Table 4. Observed and predicted aggregates, married women, Norway 1994 
Not working Public sector Private sector Variables 
Observed Predicted Observed Predicted Observed Predicted 
Choice probabilities 0.080 0.079 0.492 0.483 0.428 0.438 
Annual hours 0 0 1641 1585 1570 1632 
McFadden’s ρ2 
McFadden’s adjusted ρ2 
0.211 
0.195 
 
Figure1. Probabilities and frequencies :  
1 not working, 2-8 working in public sector; 9-15 working in private 
sector                                                  
0,00
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4.5. Wage elasticities 
The mean utility, ψj(.) , is the utility concept that comes closest to the one often used by others in the 
calculation of elasticities. To calculate these elasticities one has to assume that the labor supply of the 
mean sample household can be simulated by maximizing the deterministic part of the utility function 
under the constraint represented by a linearized version of the budget constraint. Of course, this 
approach is rather crude since it implies that the stochastic structure of the model is ignored. 
 Another set of elasticities arises when we consider how the mean in the distribution of labor 
supply is affected by changes in say, wage levels. We denote these elasticities as aggregate ones since 
they take into account unobserved and observed heterogeneity in the population. Moreover, they also 
account for the non-convexity of the budget constraint due to taxation and restrictions on hours, and 
are thus consistent with the structure of the model. 
33 
 In Table 5 we report what we have called aggregate uncompensated elasticities. They are 
calculated as follows: The model is used to simulate the labor supply for each female under the current 
regime and when the wage rates in each sector, and in both sectors, respectively, are increased by one 
per cent. The aggregate elasticity of female labor supply is obtained by calculating the relative change 
in the mean female labor supply (over all females in the sample) that results from a one per cent wage 
increase for the females, ceteris paribus.   
 
Table 5. Aggregate uncompensated wage elasticities, married women, Norway 1994 
Elasticities with respect to changes in 
wage rates 
 
 
 
Variables 
Choice 
probabilities 
and mean hours 
before wage 
changes 
Public 
sector 
Private 
sector 
Both 
sectors 
Participation probabilities: 
Working 0.921 0.15 0.16 0.28 
Working in public sector 0.483 1.52 -1.40 0.09 
Working in private sector 0.438 -1.29 1.80 0.48 
Mean annual hours of work,  
conditional on sector: 
Public sector  1585 0.36 0.03 0.37 
Private sector  1632 -0.09 0.17 0.34 
Mean total annual hours of work:     
Unconditional 1480 0.34 0.37 0.65 
 
Elasticities are numerically small apart from the case when sector specific wage levels are changed. 
The reasons why overall responses are small are due to high overall labor market participation among 
married Norwegian women and a regulated and rigid market of offered hours of work. However, we 
note that when the wage level in the public sector is increased by 1 per cent, the participation 
probability in this sector increases by as much as 1.52 per cent. Most of this increase comes at the 
expense of a decrease in the participation probability in the private sector of minus 1.29 per cent. 
Overall participation increases by a minor 0.15 per cent. A similar pattern emerges when the wage 
level in the private sector is raised by 1 per cent. The probability of working in the private sector 
increases by 1.80 per cent and as in the preceding case, most of the increase comes from a reduction of 
the probability of working in the other sector, the public sector (minus 1.40 per cent). A similar pattern 
emerges for annual hours of work, conditional on sector, but the impact is smaller. From the last row 
in Table 5 we notice that an overall increase of 1 per cent is estimated to increase supplied hours in our 
sample by 0.65 per cent, with an almost equal split on increased participation and increased supply of 
hours, conditional on working. 
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 In Table 6 we report wage elasticities across deciles in the distribution of wage rates 
(predicted). We distinguish between the bottom 10 per cent, the middle of 80 per cent and the top 10 
per cent in the distribution of wage rates in the population. The purpose of doing this is to see whether 
the wage elasticities are declining with the wage rate, and hence with potential income, of the female. 
If so, the potential well off women will be less responsive with regard to economic incentives than 
women with less potential income, see Røed and Strøm (2002) for a discussion of this topic and for 
references to previous studies that have reported this result. 
 From Table 6 we observe that the probability of participation is increasing with the wage 
rate. In the bottom decile of the wage distribution it equals 85.8 percent, while in the top decile it is 
97.3 percent. We observe that the probability of working in the public sector is increasing with the 
wage rate, whereas the opposite is the case for the private sector. Expected hours of work, conditional 
on working in a specific sector, is increasing with the wage rate in both sectors. It is interesting to note 
that hours of work tend to be significantly higher in the private sector than in the public, in the top 
decile it is close to 10 per cent higher. Also, the ratio of hours worked in the top decile relative to the 
bottom decile is higher in the private sector (17 per cent higher) than in the public sector (10 per cent 
higher). Apparently, this may reflect the fact that hours are more restricted in the public than in the 
private sector making it possible for the higher educated woman, working in the private sector, to 
extend working hours beyond hours related to so-called full-time jobs. It should also be emphasized 
that the variance in the wage rate distribution is larger in the private than in the public sector. Thus the 
perceived chance of obtaining a higher wage rate is higher in the private sector than in the public. 
Hence, less regulated hours and a chance of obtaining a higher wage rate may explain why working 
hours are higher in the private than in the public sector.  
 Due to the differences in participation probabilities and working hours, given the sector, 
across deciles in the wage rate distribution, the unconditional expected hours of work in the population 
is much higher (21 per cent) in the top deciles of the wage distribution than in the bottom deciles. 
 With some interesting exceptions the wage elasticities are declining with the wage rate. 
Thus, we get the result that labor supply of a woman with a potential high wage rate and hence 
potential high income, (given hours of work) is less responsive than for a woman with lower potential 
wage rate. The exceptions are own wage and cross wage elasticities related to participation in the 
private sector. Here it seems that a higher wage in the private sector increases the probability of 
working in the private sector, and more so among those with the highest potential wage rate. Again, 
the combination of less regulation of hours worked and the possibility of obtaining higher wages may 
be the reason. The numerical values of the cross wage elasticities in the private sector (the elasticities 
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of participation in the private sector with respect to the wage in the public sector) are increasing with 
the wage rate.  
 
Table 6.  Aggregate uncompensated wage elasticities across deciles in the distribution of wage 
rates 
Elasticities with respect to changes in 
wage rates 
 
 
 
Variables 
Choice 
probabilities 
and mean hours 
before wage 
changes 
Public 
sector 
Private 
sector 
Both 
sectors 
Participation probabilities: 
Working:     
10 percent lowest wage 0.858 0.17 0.26 0.39 
80 percent in the middle 0.917 0.08 0.16 0.29 
10 percent highest wage 0.973 0.10 0.06 0.15 
Working in public sector:     
10 percent lowest wage 0.354 1.96 -1.63 0.20 
80 percent in the middle 0.452 1.63 -1.46 0.11 
10 percent highest wage 0.726 0.81 -1.01 0.01 
Working in private sector:     
10 percent lowest wage 0.504 -1.08 1.60 0.53 
80 percent in the middle 0.464 -1.27 1.74 0.45 
10 percent highest wage 0.247 -2.00 3.20 0.88 
Mean annual hours of work,  
conditional on sector: 
Public sector:      
10 percent lowest wage 1477 0.41 0.03 0.45 
80 percent in the middle 1562 0.34 0.03 0.37 
10 percent highest wage 1629 0.30 0.03 0.32 
Private sector:      
10 percent lowest wage 1509 0.03 0.34 0.37 
80 percent in the middle 1606 0.04 0.30 0.33 
10 percent highest wage 1774 0.06 0.24 0.31 
Mean total annual hours of work     
Unconditional:     
10 percent lowest wage 1283 0.37 0.54 0.81 
80 percent in the middle 1454 0.34 0.37 0.65 
10 percent highest wage 1622 0.30 0.24 0.49 
 
 The overall elasticities are low, which reflect that labor market participation is high among 
married women in Norway and regulations on working hours impose restrictions on choices. But this 
low labor supply elasticities clearly shadow for high sector specific elasticities. This implies that with 
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sector specific changes in wage rates one should expect a considerable increase in the mobility across 
sectors. The Norwegian economy is a highly unionized economy with coordinated wage settlements 
supported by the unions and the governments. Hence, sector specific changes in wage rates have been 
the exception rather than the rule. However in recent years, the unions for the higher educated as well 
as the employers associations in the public and the private sector have pressed for more local wage 
settlements and with a stronger emphasize on providing higher returns to their education than what the 
present compressed wage structure in Norway implies. The elasticities above then indicates that such 
sector (or even job-specific) wage rate increases may give rise to a much higher mobility across sector 
and jobs than what has been observed recently in the Norwegian economy. It is likely that local wage 
settlements focusing on increased returns to education first will take place in the private sector. Our 
model then predicts that an increase in private sector real wages, say of 5 per cent, relative to the 
wages in the public sector, and restricted to those belonging to the top decile in the wage distribution, 
will increase the probability of working in the private sector for these women from 24.7 per cent to 
28,7 percent and reduce the probability of working in the public sector from 72.6 per cent to 68.9 per 
cent. These changes may not be viewed as large by say, US standards, but they are sizeable by 
Norwegian standards. We observe that the impact on overall labor market participation from such a 
change in wage rates will be negligible (elasticity equals 0.06), the reason being that the participation 
rate among these women is very high, close to 100 per cent. Expected hours of work, given the sector 
affiliation, will increase in both sectors. A labor supply elasticity of 0.24 in the private sector for the 
women belonging to the top decile, implies that on average expected hours will increase by 22 hours a 
year when wage rates for the women in the top decile, working in the private sector are raised by 5 per 
cent. In the public sector the cross elasticity equals 0.03, which implies that expected hours increase 
by 2.5 hours a year. The reason why it is positive (although negligible) is that those moving from the 
public to the private sector, when the private sector wage is increased, work less hours in the public 
sector than those remaining in the public sector.          
4.6 A flat tax reform 
In Table 7 below we show the result of replacing the tax system of 1994 by a flat tax rate, which is 
determined so as to keep the tax revenue (for married couples) unchanged. In doing so, we account for 
the fact that the change in the tax system will also change after-tax wage income of the husbands. The 
tax of 28 per cent on capital income is kept constant. We find that a tax rate of approximately 29 per 
cent charged from the very first Krone earned brings in the same tax revenue as the 1994 tax rules do. 
It is interesting to note that this tax rate is close to the tax rate charged on capital income. From Table 
7 we note that this potential tax reform increases overall labor supply, participation as well as hours 
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worked, but not by much. The overall participation probability increases by merely 0.07 percentage 
points, that is, from 92.1 to 92.8 per cent. Expected hours of work in the total population is increased 
by 108 hours, altering annual hours of work from 1480 to 1588. These changes shadow for stronger 
responses across sectors and deciles in the wage distribution. 
 The flat tax reform implies a flow of workers, away from the public sector and towards the 
private sector. The overall probability of working in the public sector is reduced by 2.65 percent, from 
48.3 to 45.6, whereas the private sector participation probability increases from 43.8 to 46.5. These 
flows increase with the wage rate. Women who belong to the top decile are predicted to increase their 
participation probability in the private sector by as much as 7.56 percentage points, that is, from 24.7 
percent to 32.3, most of this increase is due to a reduction among “well-paid” women working in the 
public sector. 
 
Table 7.  A flat tax reform with same tax revenue as with the 1994 tax rules. Percentage points 
changes in probabilities and changes in annual hours. Flat tax relative to 1994 rules. 
The flat tax rate is 29 percent 
Variables 
Women’s 
wage, first 
deciles 
Women’s 
wage, 
middle 
deciles 
Women’s 
wage, top 
deciles 
All 
 Percentage points 
Probability of working 0.57 -0.14 1.13 0.07 
Probability of working in public sector -0.87 -2.44 -6.43 -2.65 
Probability of working in private 
sector 1.44 2.30 7.56 2.72 
 Annual hours (Changes in percent) 
Mean annual hours of work 
conditional on sector: 
    
Public sector 46 (3.1) 80 (5.1) 118 (7.2) 80 (5.1) 
Private sector 99 (6.5) 148 (9.2) 216 (12.2) 126 (7.8) 
Mean total annual hours of work, 
unconditional: 76 (5.9) 105 (7.2) 169 (10.4) 108 (7.4) 
 
 The reasons for these responses are; first that this tax reform forces women in the lowest 
deciles to work harder (they have to pay higher taxes on the margin as well as a per cent of total 
income). Second, the women at the top of the wage rate distribution get a substantial reduction in the 
marginal tax rates. This incentive to work more dominates over the fact that the average tax, taxes paid 
relative to household income, also is reduced. Our calculations of income elasticities (not shown here) 
indicate that the income effects are not strong. 
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 The women in the middle of the wage rate distribution get almost no change in their 
marginal tax rate, but they enjoy a reduction in taxes paid relative to household income (remember 
that the tax rate on the labor income of their spouse is also changed). As shown in Table 7 there is a 
minor reduction in the probability of working among women in the middle deciles. Finally, a flat tax 
of 29 percent makes is more attractive to increase hours of work, in particular among the women with 
the highest earning potential and also, especially in the private sector, where the regulation of hours is 
less than in the public sector.      
4.7. Comparison between our model and a van Soest type model specification 
In this section we discuss the results of estimating the flexible preference model (FPM) of van Soest, 
Das and Gong (2002). The estimates are reported in Appendix E. First we have estimated a 
specification  where the utility function is approximated by a polynomial of degree 5. Fixed costs of 
working is included as well as a random effect  associated with leisure in a completely similar way as 
in van Soest, Das and Gong (2002). The random effect in the wage equation is however included in a 
similar way as in our model described above. From Table E.1 we observe that most of the coefficients 
are not sharply determined with the exception of the coefficients attached to the variables that are 
assumed to affect the fixed costs of working. Similarly to van Soest, Das and Gong (2002) we obtain 
the unreasonable result that fixed cost of working decreases with the number of children. By 
comparing the likelihood values of Table E.1 and Table 3 we realize that our model explains data 
much better than the FPM. Recall that our model differs from the FPM not only in the specification of 
the functional form of the utility function, also the specification of the opportunity sets are very 
different. A very disturbing fact with the estimates of the FPM reported in Table E.1 is that for most of 
the households the fixed costs of working exceed after tax wage income, given positive hours, yielding 
negative disposable incomes.    
 Second, we have estimated the FPM without a representation of fixed costs of working. The 
empirical estimates for a 3rd and 5th order polynomial utility specifications are given in Table E.2. 
Again, our model explains data much better than the van Soest, Das and Gong (2002) model. In 
Figures E.1 and E.2 we give the estimated indifference curves for an average woman and we observe 
that the estimated utility function is not quasi-concave. 
 Finally, in Table E.3, we report estimates based on combining a 3rd order polynomial utility 
specification with our specification of opportunity sets. Measured by McFadden’s adjusted ρ2 (see 
Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985) the goodness of fit of this combined model is the same as for our 
model, and Figure E.3 also indicates that the utility function is quasi-concave in the central area of 
consumption and leisure combinations. However, from Figures E.3 we note that the indifference 
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curves for the polynomial utility specification implies the unreasonable property that the needed 
compensation (in terms of consumption) for working one more hours is almost the same irrespective 
of hours worked. In contrast, the corresponding indifference curves for the Box Cox utility 
specification displayed in Figure E.4 shows a more reasonable pattern, namely that the needed 
compensation for working one hour more is sharply increasing with hours of work for high levels of 
hours of work. 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper we have discussed a particular approach for labor supply modeling, with special 
reference to the following issues: 
(i) Households may have preferences over jobs, characterized by job- and sector-specific non-
pecuniary attributes, hours of work and wage rates.   
(ii) Exact representation of complicated and non-convex budget constraints, and convenient 
representations of the set of feasible job attributes, 
(iii) Justification of the functional form of the utility function and the distribution of unobserved 
variables. 
 We have demonstrated that the framework presented proves to be practical for dealing with 
(i) and (ii). A more fundamental theoretical issue is the problem of characterizing the functional form 
of the empirical model on the basis of theoretical principles. By drawing on the recent literature in 
measurement theory and theoretical psychophysics, we have shown that it is possible to apply 
invariance principles to constrain and justify the class of admissible functional forms for the utility 
function. 
 An empirical version of the model has been estimated on a sample of Norwegian married 
women. The estimated model turns out to reproduce the data quite well. It is demonstrated that it is of 
empirical importance to distinguish between job opportunities across sectors of the economy. In terms 
of wage elasticties the model yields moderate responses in overall female labor supply in contrast to 
stronger inter-sector mobility. We also report the impact of labor supply of replacing the 1994 tax 
rules by a revenue neutral flat tax reform. It is shown that this reform stimulates labor supply, in 
particular among the women with the highest wage rates. Moreover, this tax reform provides 
incentives to switch from jobs in the public sector to jobs in the private sector, in particular among 
women with potentially high wage rates.  
 Apparently, the rich households will benefit from having the progressive tax system (as of 
1994) replaced by a flat tax system without any tax breaks at low incomes. The elasticities set out in 
Table 6 indicate that a tax reform that focuses on providing stronger incentives to work among married 
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women with lower potential wage rate and hence income may improve efficiency of the economy 
more than a pure flat tax reform. Cutting marginal taxes for those with the lowest potential income, 
keeping total tax revenue fixed, may also give these households welfare gains instead of the potential 
rich households. However, it is beyond the scope of the present article to estimate the gains and losses 
in utility terms across households and to analyze the impact on efficiency and equity of various tax 
systems. This is left for future research.  
 We have also investigated the modeling framework with flexible preferences (FPM), 
proposed by van Soest, Das and Dong (2002). Although more experience with this framework is 
needed before a definite conclusion can be reached, the empirical results we have obtained indicate 
that this framework does not seem to be promising as a general research strategy for labor supply 
analysis. This is due to, (i) the inability of the pure FPM to accommodate institutional restrictions on 
hours of work and the sets of feasible jobs, (ii) the failure of the polynomial utility representation to 
fulfill global quasi-concavity and monotonicity properties. Although these properties are not required 
for the existence of a utility maximum in the discrete case, they are certainly plausible from an 
economic point of view.     
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Appendix A 
Constrained demand and IIA 
Here the purpose is to show that the traditional theory of consumer behavior yields restrictions that 
appear (in some sense) more restrictive than IIA. 
 Consumer i has quasi-concave, increasing utility function Ui(x). The utilities vary randomly 
across consumers due to unobserved heterogeneity in tastes. Let B be the choice set, i.e. a set of 
quantity restrictions on x in addition to the budget constraint, and let *ix (p, y,B)  denote the 
constrained demand function of price p, income y and choice set B. Let A B⊂ , and define 
 ( )*iP(A,B) P x (p, y,B) A .= ∈  
The empirical counterpart to P(A,B) is the fraction of consumers that choose a vector of consumption 
quantities within A, conditional on quantity constraints represented by B. Now it follows from quasi-
concavity and monotonicity of utility that for two choice sets, B1 and B2, that ( ) ( )1 2P A,B P A,B=  
provided A belongs to the interior 1 2B B∩ . This is due to the fact that only the point of tangency 
between the budget line and the indifference curve matter for the determination of the demand. In 
other words, when A belongs to the interior of the choice set the theory predicts that the choice 
probability P(A,B) is independent of B as long as A belongs to the interior of B. Thus, the 
conventional theory yields restrictions that are similar to IIA and appear even more restrictive than 
IIA, since IIA only predicts that ( ) ( )1 2P A ,B P A ,B  is independent of B, where 1 2A , A B⊂ . An 
equivalent statement of IIA is that ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1 2 2 1 2 2P A ,B P A ,B P A ,B P A ,B= , which of course is a 
weaker condition than ( ) ( )1 2P A,B P A,B= . 
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Appendix B 
 
 Proof of Theorem 1 
 By Assumption 1 and (2.2) 
(B.1) ( )U(z) ψ H(z),W(z) ε(z),=  
where we for simplicity have suppressed non-labor income I in the notation. The proof is completely 
analogous to the proof of Theorem 7 in Dagsvik (1994), but for the sake of completeness we give an 
alternative proof here. 
 From Assumptions 2 and 3, and Proposition 3.8, p. 135 in Resnick (1987) it follows that 
( ){ }H(z),W(z), (z) ,z 1,2,...ε =  are realizations of a Poisson process on ( 20,h R+⎤ ×⎦  with intensity 
measure ( )d h,w,λ ε  defined by 
(B.2) ( ) ( )d h,w, g h, w ( )dh dw dλ ε = κ ε ε  
for h 0, w 0, 0> > ε > . Let A be a Borel set in (0,h R+⎤ ×⎦ , and define 
(B.3) ( )( ) ( )A zU max H(z),W(z) subject to H(z),W(z) A= ψ ∈ . 
UA is the highest utility the agent can attain, subject to ( )H(z), W(z) A∈ . Let 
 0}εA,w)ψ(h,:ε)w,{(h,B >∈=  
and let N(B) be the number of Poisson process points within B. By the Poisson law 
(B.4) ( ) ( )n(B)P N(B) n exp (B)
n!
Λ= = −Λ  
where (B) EN(B)Λ = , and is given by 
(B.5) ( ) ( )
( )( ) ( ) ( )B x,y A, x,y u A
u(B) d x, y, ( )g x, y d dx dy M g x, y dx dy
x, y∈ ψ ε>
⎛ ⎞Λ = λ ε = κ ε ε = ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ψ⎝ ⎠∫ ∫ ∫ ∫  
where 
 M( ) (v)dv
∞
ε
ε = κ∫ . 
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This is so because ( )d h,w,λ ε  is the probability that there is a Poisson point within 
( ) ( ) ( )h,h dh w,w dw , d+ × + × ε ε + ε  and ( )
B
d x, y,λ ε∫  is the “sum” of probabilities of all possible 
Poisson point locations within B. 
 Note moreover that for any A and C that are disjoint Borel sets on ( ]0,h R+× , UA and UC 
will be independent. This property is an immediate consequence of the fact that the points of the 
Poisson process ( ){ }H(z),W(z), (z) ,z 1,2,...ε =  are independently scattered. Now consider a choice 
setting where the agent has the choice of “not working” or to choose a job with ( )H(z),W(z) A C∈ ∪ , 
where A and C are two disjoint Borel sets in (0,h R+⎤ ×⎦ . For IIA to be satisfied it must be the case 
that the probability of choosing a job with hours and wage rate within A must have the form 
(B.6) ( )( ) AA C
A C
VP U max U ,U(0)
V V V(0)
> = + +  
where VA, VC and V(0) are suitable scale parameters associated with the respective “alternatives” A, C 
and “not working”. From Yellott (1977) we know that this can only happen if the utilities have the 
form 
(B.7) A A Alog U log V log= + η  
and similarly for the other alternatives, where Alogη , Clogη  and log (0)η  are i.i. type III exteme 
value distributed, i.e., 
 ( ) ( )yAP log y exp e−η ≤ = − . 
But this means that A A AU V= η , where 
(B.8) ( ) ( )1AP u exp u−η ≤ = − . 
Consequently, it follows from (B.4), (B.5), (B.7) and (B.8) that 
(B.9)
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
A
1
A A A
A
P U u P There are no points of the Poisson process in B
x, y
P N(B) 0 exp (B) exp M g x, y dx dy P V u exp u V
u
−
≤ =
⎛ ⎞⎛ ψ ⎞= = = −Λ = − = η ≤ = −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠∫
 
which yields 
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(B.10) ( ) ( )A A
V uM g x, y dx dy
u x, y
⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ψ⎝ ⎠∫ . 
Let [ ] [ ]1 1 1 1A h ,h w ,w , 0 h h h, 0 w w= × < < < < < . By differentiating (B.10) with respect to h and w 
we obtain that 
(B.11) ( ) ( ) ( )
V h,w uM g h,w
u h, w
⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ψ⎝ ⎠
%
 
for some suitable function ( )V h, w% . Eq. (B.11) implies that M(ε) has the form 1−θε  where 0θ >  is a 
constant, so that 
 .θεκ(ε) 2−=  
Recall that we already established above that (0) (0)η = ε  is standard type I extreme value distributed. 
With ,θεκ(ε) 2−=  we get from (B.10) that 
(B.12) ( ) ( )A
A
V x, y g x, y dx dy= θ ψ∫ . 
Let job.chosen   thedenote zˆ  Hence, with D C A= ∪ , we get from (B.6) that 
(B.13) ( ) A
D
θ ψ(x,y)g(x,y)dxdy
ˆ ˆ(h,w) P H(z) h,W(z) w
ψ(0,0) θ ψ(x,y)g(x,y)dxdy
Φ = ≤ ≤ = +
∫
∫ . 
From (B.13) it follows that for h 0, w 0> > , the corresponding density is given by 
(B.14) 
D
(h,w)g(h,w)(h,w)
(0,0) (x, y)g(x, y)dx dy
θψϕ = ψ + θ ψ∫  
which yields (2.5). 
  Q.E.D. 
 
 Proof of Theorem 2 
 Assume first that Assumption 5 holds. In this case leisure L is kept fixed, and we shall for 
simplicity drop it in the notation, i.e., we write ( )v C,h v(C)=  and ( ) ( )1 2 1 2C ,L;C ,L C ,Cϕ = ϕ% % . In this 
case we see from (2.12) that we can write 
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(B.15) ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 2 1 2C ,C F v C v Cϕ =%  
where 
(B.16) F y y
y
( ) = +1  
for y > 0 . Recall also that the input stimuli (consumption C), is measured on a ratio scale. Hence, 
Theorem 14.19 in Falmagne, p. 338, (see also his discussion on an application following the theorem) 
implies that 
(B.17) ( ) ( ) ( )1 11 1 1 2*1 2
1 1
C 1 C 1
C ,C F
α α⎛ ⎞β − β −⎜ ⎟ϕ = −⎜ ⎟α α⎝ ⎠
%
%  
where β1 0> ,  1 0,β >%  and α1 are constants, and F* is a strictly increasing continuous function.12 
Recall, however, that α, β1 and 1β%  may depend on L. Since C1 and C2 can attain any positive value and 
can vary independently, it follows that the domain of F* must be R. Also the balance condition 
 ( ) ( )~ , ~ ,ϕ ϕC C C C1 2 2 1 1+ =  
must hold. In particular with C C C1 2= = ,  we obtain that ( )~ , . ,ϕ C C = 0 5  for all C, which by (B.17) 
implies that 1 1 1β = β ≡ β% . Let ( )M x F F x( ) ( ) .*= −1  Since F* is continuous, and F is continuous and 
strictly increasing, it follows that M(x) is continuous and strictly increasing. Thus, from (B.16) and 
(B.17) we get that 
(B.18) 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
1 1
1 1 1 2 1
1 1 2
C 1 C 1 v C
M .
v C
α α⎛ ⎞β − β −⎜ ⎟− =⎜ ⎟α α⎝ ⎠
 
Let 
 
( ) ( )1 11 1 1 2
1 1
C 1 C 1
x
α αβ − β −= −α α  
and 
                                                     
12 From Falmagne's Theorem 14.19 it follows that 0α ≥ . It is, however, easy to verify that the proof of the theorem also 
applies when α is negative. Note that the above results do not depend on the particular structure of the function F(⋅) given by 
(2.12). Also it is not required that F and v are differentiable. It is sufficient that this function is strictly increasing and 
continuous and (2.10) holds. 
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( )11 2
1
C 1
y ,
αβ −= α  
With C1 and C2 set equal to one, alternatively, we obtain that 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 2v C v(1)M x y , and v C v(1)M y= + = − , 
so that (B.18) yields  
(B.19) ( ) ( )M(x) M x y M y= + − . 
With x 0= , it follows from (B.18) and (B.19) that  
(B.20) M(y)M( y) M(0) 1− = = .  
Although y is only defined for 1 1y ≥ −β α , we realize that due to the symmetry of (B.20), (B.19) must  
hold for all real x and y. Hence, (B.19) and (B.29) imply the following functional equation 
(B.21) M x M y M x y( ) ( ) ( )= +  
which must hold for x y R, .∈  Now recall that (B.21) is the well-known Cauchy equation which 
solution is the exponential function, cf. Theorem 3.2 and Remark 3.3 in Falmagne (1985), p. 82. 
Consequently, it follows from (B.21) that  
(B.22) ( )11 1 1log v(C) C 1α= γ + β − α  
where γ1 is a constant. We now need to re-enter L into the notation. Thus, (B.22) will now be written 
as 
(B.23) ( ) 1 (L)1 1
1
C 1log v C,1 L (L) (L)
(L)
α⎛ ⎞−− = γ + β ⎜ ⎟α⎝ ⎠
, 
since α1 and β1 may depend on L, and where total number of feasible hours is normalized to one. In a 
completely analogous way we get from Assumption 6 that 
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(B.24) ( ) 2 (C)2 2
2
L 1log v C,1 L (C) (C)
(C)
α⎛ ⎞−− = γ + β ⎜ ⎟α⎝ ⎠
 
where 2 (C)γ , 2 (C)β  and 2 (C)α  are unspecified functions of C. To simplify the exposition the 
remaining part of the proof will be divided into 7 cases. 
 
Case (i): 1 2(L) (C) 0α = α = . 
In this case (B.23) and (B.24) imply that 
(B.25) 1 1 2 2(L) (L) logC (C) (C)log Lγ + β = γ + β , 
which must hold for all positive C and L. We can write *1 1 1(L) (L)β = β + β%  and *2 2 2(C) (C)β = β + β%  
where *1β  and *2β  are constants and 1β% and 2β%  are zero or depend on L and C respectively. This implies 
that 
(B.26) * *1 1 1 2 2 2(L) logC (L)logC (C) log L (C)log Lγ + β + β = γ + β + β% % . 
Evidently, (B.26) implies that *1 2(L) log Lγ = β , *2 1(C) logCγ = β , 1 3(L) log Lβ = β%  and 
2 3(C) logCβ = β%  where β3 is a constant. Hence 
(B.27) ( ) * *2 1 3log v C,1 L log L logC log LlogC− = β + β + β . 
 
Case (ii): 1 2 1(L) 0, (C) 0, (L)α ≠ α ≠ γ  and γ2(C) are not constants.  
In this case (B.23) and (B.24) imply a relation of the form 
(B.28) 1 1 2 2α (L) α (L) α (C) α (C)1 1 1 2 2 2γ (L) β C β (L)C γ (C) β L β (C)L
∗ ∗+ + = + +% % , 
which must hold for all non-negative L and C. Similarly to the above case, we now have written 
*
1 1 1 1(L) (L) (L)β α = β + β% , where 1β (L)%  is zero or depend on L. Furthermore, we have also written 
*
2 2 2 2(C) (C) (C)β α = β + β% , where 2β (C)%  is zero or depend on C. Also (L)γ1 and (C)γ 2 are zero or 
depend on L and C, respectively. Note that the left hand side of (B.28) contains an additive term, 
γ1(L), that depends solely on L (or equals zero). This implies that the right hand side of (B.28) must 
also contain an additive term that depends solely on L. The only term on the right hand side of (B.28) 
that can vary solely with L is the term 2 (C)*2L
αβ , and this can happen only when 2 (C)α  is a constant, 
51 
α2. Similarly, since 2 (C)γ  depends on C it follows that 1(L)α  must be a constant, α1. This implies 
that 
 2*1 2(L) L
αγ = β , 
 1*2 1(C) C
αγ = β  
and 
 21 α2
α
1 (C)Lβ
~(L)Cβ~ =  
which imply that 
 2121 αα3
α
2
α
1 LCβ(C)Lβ
~(L)Cβ~ ==  
where β3 is a constant. 
 
Case (iii): 1 2 1(L) 0, (C) 0, (L)α ≠ α ≠ γ  is a constant, 2 (C)γ  is not a constant. 
Since 1(L)γ  is a constant we can without loss of generality set it equal to zero. As a result (B.28) 
reduces to 
(B.29) 1 1 2 2α (L) α (L) α (C) α (C)1 1 2 2 2β C β (L)C γ (C) β L β (C)L
∗ ∗+ = + +% %  
Since 2 (C)γ  is not a constant and (C)α 2  is different from zero, then (B.29) can only hold if 1(L)α  is 
a constant, α1, and 1*2 1(C) Cαγ = β . Hence, (B.29) reduces to 
(B.30) ( )1 2α α (C)1 2 2β (L)C β β (C) L∗= +% % . 
Note that (B.30) is multiplicative separable in L and C. Hence, (B.30) can thus only be true if 2 (C)α  
is a constant, α2, so that 
 2α1 3β (L) β L=%  
for some constant β3. But then *2 0β =  and 
 1α2 3β (C) β C=% . 
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Case (iv): 1 2 1(L) 0, (C) 0, (L)α ≠ α ≠ γ is not a constant, 2 (C)γ  is a constant. 
This case is completely analogous to Case (iii) and is therefore omitted. 
 
Case (v): 1 2 1(L) 0, (C) 0, (L)α ≠ α ≠ γ  and 2 (C)γ  are constants. 
In this case we can set .0γ1 = Then (B.29) becomes 
(B.31) 1 1 2 2α (L) α (L) α (C) α (C)1 1 2 2 2β C β (L)C γ β L β (C)L
∗ ∗+ = + +% % . 
Evidently, (B.31) implies that =2γ 0. Moreover, by taking the logarithm mapping on both sides of 
(B.31) we obtain 
(B.32) ( ) ( )1 1 1 2 2 2log β β (L) α (L)logC log β β (C) α (C)log L.∗ ∗+ + = + +% %  
Evidently, (B.32) can only hold provided 
 ( )1 1 2log β β (L) α (C)log L constant∗ + = +%  
in which case (C)α 2 must be a constant, and 0β1 =∗ , so that 2α1β (L) L=% . Similarly, it follows that 
1(L)α  is a constant, α1 and 1α (L)2β (C) C=% . 
 In the case where both 1β (L)%  and 2β (C)% are equal to zero, (B.32) implies that 1(L) log Lα =  
and 2 (C) logC,α =  so that 
(B.33) ( ) 3log v C,1 L log L logC− = β ⋅ . 
Thus this case coincides with a special case of Case (i) above. 
 
 The remaining cases are Case (vi): 1 2(L) 0, (C) 0α = α ≠  and Case (vii): 
1 2(L) 0, (C) 0α ≠ α = . The analysis of these cases is completely analogous to the previous cases and is 
therefore omitted. We therefore conclude that all the cases considered above yield the functional form 
that is claimed in the theorem. 
  Q.E.D. 
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Appendix C 
Equilibrium considerations 
How the opportunity density θg(h,w) is determined has been analyzed in Dagsvik (2000), and we refer 
to this paper for a detailed analysis. In the present paper we shall only draw on some results obtained 
by Dagsvik (2000) to justify the structure of the opportunity density.  
 Dagsvik (2000) considers a particular matching equilibrium setting, which is analogous to 
Crawford and Knoer (1981), see also Roth and Sotomayor (1990). In this setup suppliers have 
preferences over firms (jobs) including contracts (such as wage rates) and they search to obtain a 
suitable match among the potential firms. The set of contracts is discrete. Similarly, firms have 
preferences over suppliers and contracts and they search to obtain a suitable match among the 
potential suppliers. Assume that a firms’ conditional profit function of hiring a worker at contract 
(h,w), given technology (indexed by t), has the form  
 ( ) ( )1/b h, w, t h, w, t γη%   
where ( ){ }h,w, tη  are positive random variables with standard type I extreme value distribution that 
that are i.i.d. over all combinations of hours, wage rates and technologies. These errors account for 
unobserved heterogeneity in firms’ preferences. The term ( )b h,w, t% is positive and deterministic and 
0γ >  is a positive parameter that governs the dispersion of the random error terms. Maximizing the 
conditional profit function above is of course equivalent to maximizing the function 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )b h,w, t h,w, t b h,w, t h,w, tγ η = η% , (say). For simplicity, we assume in this exposition that 
(h,w,t) belong to a finite set. Supposed next that, on average, the firms' production functions have the 
constant returns to scale property. Then it follows, conditional on hours, that the average conditional 
profit function has the form ( ) tb h,w, t hQ hw= −% , so that  
 ( ) tb h,w, t h (Q w)γ γ= − , 
where Qt is a positive term that depends on output, and input prices (apart from the wage rate). 
Due to the properties of the extreme value distribution it follows that  
(C.1) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
t
t t
Q w
Max b h,w, t h,w, t h, w b h, w h,w h Q w γγ
≥
η = η = η −∑  
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where ( ){ }h,wη  are random variables that also have type I standard extreme value c.d.f. In the 
Scandinavian economies the hours of work schedules are highly regulated, as discussed in the text 
above. Thus, if hours of work in the short run can be considered as fixed like other fixed inputs, the 
firm’s maximization of the conditional profit function is equivalent to maximizing ( )h,w b(w)η , 
where 
(C.2) ( )
t
t
Q w
b(w) Q w γ
≥
= −∑ . 
The error terms ( ){ }h,wη , as well as b(w), depend on the respective suppliers, but for simplicity we 
have suppressed this in the notation. Thus, since hours of work here can be viewed as a given attribute 
of the firm it follows from Dagsvik (2000), Section 6.2 that ( )h,w b(w)η  is actually the proper 
representation of the firms' preferences in this case. Moreover, similarly to eq. (6.11) in Dagsvik 
(2000) the opportunity density can be expressed as  
(C.3) ( )g h, w b(w)K(h)θ =  
where K(h) (equal to Mh/Bh in the notation of Dagsvik, 2000 when j is replaced by h) is a positive 
factor that is determined by equilibrium conditions that are discussed in Dagsvik (2000). The factor 
K(h) will therefore depend on the structural terms of the utility functions and on {b(w)}.  
 Note that even if offered hours are not fixed in the short run we still realize from (C.1) that 
the implied offered hours and wage rates become independent. 
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Appendix D 
Selectivity bias of the wage equation 
In this appendix we discuss a simple method that corrects for selectivity bias in the wage equation. Let 
Uj denote the utility of working in sector j and U0 the utility of not working. Assume that 
j j jU v , j 0,1,2= + ε = , where v1, v2, v0 , are suitable deterministic terms and ε1, ε2 and ε0 are random 
variables that are independent of the deterministic terms and have extreme value c.d.f. 
( )( )exp exp 0.5772 x− − . This particular version of the extreme value distribution is convenient here 
because it implies that the error terms have zero mean. It follows that the probability of working in 
sector j, Pj, is given by  
(D.1) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )jj j k k 0 1 2
exp v
P P U max U
exp v exp v exp v
= = = + + . 
Let the wage equation of sector j be given by  
(D.2) j j jln W X= β + η  
where ηj  is a zero mean random variable that is independent of Xβj . The random variable εj may be 
correlated with ηj, due for example to a common latent ability factor. To accommodate this possibility 
assume that 
(D.3) j j j j
•η = η + ρ ε , 
where ρj is an unknown parameter and j•η  is a random variable that is independent of εj for all j. We 
assume however that ηj is independent of εk for k j≠ . Recall that when the random error terms are 
extreme value distributed then the distribution of k kmax U  is independent of which alternative 
maximizes utility (see for example Strauss, 1979), and has the same c.d.f. as εj, apart from a shift in 
the mean. Recall also that 
(D.4) ( ) ( ) ( )( )k k 0 1 2E max U log exp v exp v exp v= + + . 
Hence, for j 1,2= , 
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(D.5) 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ){ }
j j k k j j j k k j j j k k j j
j k k j k k j j
j k k j j j 0 1 2 j j
j 0 1 2 j j j
E U max U E U max U E U U max U v
E max U U max U v
E max U v log exp v exp v exp v v
log exp v exp v exp v exp v log P .
η = = ρ ε = = ρ = − ρ
= ρ = − ρ
= ρ − ρ = ρ + + − ρ
= ρ + + = −ρ
 
Similarly, it follows that 
(D.6) 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
*
j j k k j j j k k j
* *
j k k j k k j j k k j
*
j j j j
Var U max U Var U max U Var
Var max U U max U Var Var max U Var
Var Var Var .
η = = ρ ε = + η
= ρ = + η = ρ + η
= ρ ε + η = η
 
Consequently, we get from (D.3), (D.5) and (D.6) that we can estimate the parameters of the wage 
equation for sector j consistently and asymptotically efficient by OLS on the sub-sample of women 
that work in sector j by means of the regression equation 
(D.7) j j j j jlog W X log P e= β − ρ + , 
where ej is a random term with conditional expectation, given that the woman works in sector j, equals 
zero and with variance equal to Var jη .  
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Appendix E 
Utility specifications with polynomial functional form 
 
Table E.1.  A full van Soest et al (2002) model, 5th order polynomial, with fixed costs of working 
 and random effects on leisure 
Variables Estimates t-values 
Fixed costs of working:Constant -40.6826  -2.2  
Log (age) 29.0781  2.5  
[log(age)]2 -4.6136  -2.7  
Children:0-6 -0.3251  -2.3  
Children:7-17 -0.9004  -3.3  
Leisure: constant 141.0824  0.4  
Log (age) -253.0138  -2.7  
[log(age)]2 33.5090  2.7  
Children 0-6 1.2267  1.6  
Children 7-17 0.5144  0.3  
C 6.1113  0.7  
L2 1515.7400  1.6  
C2 3.0905  0.7  
LC -26.9973  -0.5  
L3 -2996.6716  -1.7  
C3 0.8905  0.6  
CL2 68.9719  0.5  
C2L -3.8594  -0.3  
L4 2702.8606  1.9  
C4 -0.0586  -0.3  
L3C -113.2003  -0.8  
L2C2 -14.5633  1.0  
LC3 -4.0904  1.2  
L5 -911.2676  -2.0  
C5 -0.0177  -0.7  
L4C 70.8748  7.8  
L3C2 14.9191  1.0  
L2C3 1.7597  1.2  
LC4 -0.2744  -0.9  
σ, Std, random effect leisure 0.8541  0.1  
Loglikelihood -1870.887 
C = (disposable household income-60000)10-6 for h = 0, and C = (disposable household income-
60000)10-6-Fixed costs of working for h>0. L = 1-h/3640 
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Table E.2.  A van Soest et al (2002) model, 3trd and 5th order polynomial, without fixed costs of 
working, but with random effects on leisure 
3trdorder polynomial 5th order polynomial 
Variables 
Estimates t-values Estimates t-values 
Leisure: constant 777.6131  2.4  5931.5283  4.9  
Log age -345.8362  -2.0  -2585.6396  -5.1  
[log age]2 48.7884  2.0  366.0253  5.2  
Childr. 0-6 5.1129  2.0  41.8854  5.7  
Childr. 7-17 4.3902  2.1  35.9334  6.1  
C 92.2601  1.6  479.4819  0.3  
L2 -232.4857  -6.0  -2777.0132  -2.1  
C2 -135.8726  -1.1  -921.8157  -0.2  
LC -81.8930  -1.6  -623.8350  -0.2  
L3 98.7196  7.8  2620.7424  1.5  
C3 32.9911  0.4  1421.1451  0.2  
CL2 34.8355  3.3  1006.5788  0.4  
C2L 14.7679  0.2  -1074.9296  -0.2  
L4    -1373.2603  -1.1  
C4    -891.2262  -0.1  
L3C    -482.2893  -0.2  
L2C2    718.9698  0.2  
LC3    926.3572  0.1  
L5    322.7279  0.9  
C5    177.3576  0.1  
L4C    90.2804  0.1  
L3C2    -261.7103  -0.3  
L2C3    -230.1019  -0.2  
LC4    -189.9599  -0.1  
σ: SD of random 
effect leisure 8.8129 1.5 79.4479  6.3 
 
Log likelihood -1912.000 -1884.091 
C = (disposable household income-60000)10-6, L = 1-h/3640 
 
In two figures below we give the indifference curves for an average woman in the sample, aged 40, 
with 11.6 years of education, with 0.49 children between 0 and 6 and with 0.68 children between 7 and 
17. 
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Figure E.1.  3rd order polynomial utility function. Consumption along the vertical axis and 
leisure along the horizontal axis 
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Figure E.2.  5th order polynomial utility function. Consumption along the vertical axis and 
leisure along the horizontal axis  
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Figure E.3.  3rd order polynomial utility function, combined with ours specification of 
opportunities. Consumption along the vertical axis and leisure along the horizontal 
axis 
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Figure E.4.  Box –Cox utility function, with ours specification of opportunities. Consumption 
along the vertical axis and leisure along the horizontal 
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Table E.3.  Third degree polynomial representation of utility function (van Soest et al utility 
function) combined with our specification of opportunities 
Variables Estimates t-values 
Job-opportunities: Constant, public sector, f11 -4.4692 -4.2 
Constant, private sector, f21 0.5206 0.4 
Education, public sector,f12 0.2993 3.7 
Education, private sector -02124 -2.0 
Offered hours: Full time peak, public sector 1.4835 8.9 
Full-time peak, private sector 1.081 5.9 
Part-time peak, public sector 0.7610 3.9 
Part-time peak, private sector 0.8641 4.4 
Leisure: Constant 346.4613 5.1 
Log(age) -142.9121 -3.9 
[log (age)]2 20.6204 4.1 
Children 0-6 2.6414 5.9 
Children 7-17 2.1786 6.3 
C 137.6408 2.7 
L2 -112.8891 -4.3 
C2 -200.8554 -2.1 
LC -120.8604 -2.3 
L3 43.8384 3.1 
C3 151.6915 2.4 
CL2 55.6665 3.2 
C2L 103.3133 2.0 
Log likelihood -1751.853 
McFadden’s  ρ2 0.215 
McFadden’s  ρ2 0.195 
C = (disposable household income-60000)10-6 and L = 1-h/3640 
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Appendix F 
Tax functions and child allowances, Norway 1994 
 
Table F.1.  Tax function in 1994 for a married non-working woman, husband is working 
NOK 1994 
Wage income for the male, Y  Tax, T 
0-41907 0 
41907-140500 0.302Y-12656 
140500-252000 0.358Y-20524 
252000-263000 0.453Y-44464 
263000- 0.495Y-55510 
 
 
Table F.2.  Tax function in 1994 for a married working woman, or working man  
NOK 1994 
Wage income, Y Tax ,T 
0-20954 0 
20954-140500 0.302Y-6328 
140500-208000 0.358Y-14196 
208000-236500 0.453Y-33956 
236500- 0.495Y-43889 
 
Net capital income is taxed at the rate of 28 percent. 
 
Child allowances are given according to the following rules: 
1 Child: NOK 10 416 
2 Children: NOK 21 336 
3 Children: NOK 33 696 
4 Children: NOK 46 692 
5 Children and more: NOK 60 084 
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